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A SYSTEMS THEORY OF FRAGMENTATION
AND HARMONIZATION
ANTHONY J. COLANGELO*
International law's accelerating 'fragmentation" presents the interna-
tional legal system with what looks like a multilayered existential threat.
Theoretically, how can we conceive of international law as a unitary system
if its rules are becoming progressively frayed and pixilated to the point of
incoherence? Doctrinally, what is "the law" if different, purportedly authori-
tative, bodies interpret it so differently? And practically, how are actors in-
creasingly subject to the ever-expanding universe of international law sup-
posed to behave when the law itself is so splintered that it may point them in
many, perhaps contradictory, directions at once?
The prevailing view so far among international egal scholars, institu-
tions, and decision-makers is to "abandon every hope" of a coherent, unitary
legal system and instead settle for managing (as opposed to resolving) con-
flicting rules and interpretations thereof through conflict of laws methodolo-
gies.
This Article fights against that view; that is, it fights for the interna-
tional legal system's coherence. The Article first argues that the conflict of
laws view promises only to entrench the evils supposedly spawned by frag-
mentation that threaten to take down the system; namely, compromises in
core justice principles of equality (or the ideal that like cases be treated alike)
and predictability of the law. The Article next draws from systems theory and
its fulcrum concept of autopoiesis to defend international law as a unitary
system striving for its own survival. And it argues that, rather than posing
an existential threat, fragmentation may paradoxically be a growing pain
in the system's long-term maturation. In this connection, the Article proposes
two methodological tools for decision-makers seeking to advance the project of
a unitary international legal system: a presumption of coherence and a pre-
sumption of catholicity. In combination, these tools aim to promote legal
coherence and correctness without the compromises injustice that invariably
attend true conflict of laws disputes-compromises that conflict of laws
methods institutionalize but that this Article's coherence methods seek to
avoid.
The result is to answer the threat posed by fragmentation with a novel
alternative account of how fragmentation may: (1) fit into international
law's long-term evolution as an ultimately coherent and robust system; (2)
eventually, if counterintuitively, lead to broader and deeper harmonization
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of the law regulating international disputes, and; (3) in turn, furnish more
predictable and acceptable rules for actors involved in those disputes. In-
deed, this Article argues that its theoiry not only provides an alternative
description of fragmentation, but also that its account leads to a more just
international legal system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the great threats international law supposedly
faces today is what's popularly called the "fragmentation" of its
rules.' The proliferation of international legal subject areas as
well as administrative and judicial bodies-both national and
international-purporting to create and apply international
law makes its norms look like rays of sunlight fractured by tree
branches. This fragmentation in turn renders the rules of in-
ternational law less coherent and undermines the broader co-
herence of the international legal system itself, at least so the
argument goes.2
I challenge this prevailing view and argue that fragmenta-
tion actually represents a step toward, not away from, the co-
herence of the international legal system in crucial respects.
My main analytical tools in crafting this challenge are heuris-
1. See generally Study Group of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on Fragmen-
tation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006),
as corrected, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1 (Aug. 11, 2006) [hereinafter
ILC Report].
2. Id. 1 491; see also Barbara Stark, International Law from the Bottom Up:
Fragmentation and Transformation, 34 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 687, 694 (2013) (citing
ILC Report, supra note 1, 11 7-10).
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tics offered by systems theory.3 Recent years have seen systems
theory migrate from cybernetics to evolutionary biology to
law4-and to international law in particular.5 For international
law scholars, the reason is plain: we are in search of a theory.6
The basic idea offered by systems theory is that systems evolve
so as to perpetuate themselves, or what is called autopoiesis-
they evolve so as to secure their own survival.7 Viewed through
this lens, rules of international law habitually tilt toward foster-
ing trade and peace,8 which makes perfect sense given that the
absence of those characteristics would mean unconnected
3. See generally JOHN H. MILLER & Scorr E. PAGE, COMPLEx ADAPTIVE
SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE
(2007).
4. See generally GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAw As AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM
(1993). For a helpful analysis of how systems theory, and more specifically its
notion of autopoiesis, may apply to thinking about U.S. domestic law, see
Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the "Relative Autonomy" of Law, 19 CARDozo L.
REV. 1987 (1998).
5. See Anthony D'Amato, Groundwork for International Law, 108 Am. J.
INT'L L. 650 (2014) [hereinafter D'Amato, Groundwork]; Anthony D'Amato,
International Law as an Autopoietic System, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw IN TREATY MAKING 335 (Volker R6ben & Rdidiger Wolfrum eds., 2005)
[hereinafter D'Amato, International Law].
6. The absence of a coherent theory of international law backfoots in-
ternational lawyers and scholars right out of the gate. In very rough strokes,
ontologically and phenomenologically virtually every other legal system in
the world can claim legitimate existence by pointing to some definitive law-
making authority. International law, by contrast, is a singular exception to all
other top-down lawmaking systems in the world. It is, instead, a uniquely
bottom-up composite system of multiple coequal constituent autonomous or
semiautonomous legal systems with no overarching rulemaking or enforce-
ment authority. As such, it is perennially under attack as not really "law."
These attacks come in various flavors. Law and economics critics are fond of
game theoretic models and, more specifically, crude prisoners' dilemmas
that leave observers thinking the international legal system is nothing more
than set of default suggestions that properly should be disregarded when
cost-benefit analysis favors breaking the rule in question. There is, in other
words, no independent obligation to obey law as such, and law therefore
loses its moral imperative. Hard-nosed foreign relations critics take a some-
what similar tack but use different language. Fundamentally, these criticisms
rightly ask why nations should obey international law if all that is meant by
that term is the empirically observable and shifting practices of states. Sys-
tems theory may supply an answer.
7. See Gunther Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC
LAw: A NEw APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1, 3 (Gunther Teubner ed.,
1987).
8. See D'Amato, Groundwork, supra note 5, at 652-53.
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groups of people always either on the verge of, or at, total war;
that is to say, chaos 9-the complete absence of an interna-
tional legal system.
Integral, and almost predicate, to the system's sustained
development is the encouragement of coherent rules. Here it
will be necessary to smuggle in some preliminary concepts that
will be elaborated throughout the remainder of the article. Co-
herence is vital because it promotes two foundational features
of any successful legal system, often captured by the term "jus-
tice;"10 namely, predictability and equality, or the ideal that
like cases should be treated alike. The more states and other
international actors can predict how law will treat their activity,
the more comfortable they will be engaging in that activity"-
activity that, again, sustains the system itself.12 And a principal
way to predict how law will treat behavior is to see how law
previously treated that behavior. From the actor's perspective,
if law does not treat your behavior the same way, not only is
predictability and thus law's efficacy damaged (why comply
with law if one has no idea how law will treat one's behavior?),
but law also tarnishes its own legitimacy since a law that is un-just is unstable and "ultimately unacceptable."1 3 In short, the
more a law internally fights itself through different interpreta-
tions and applications, the less predictable and evenhanded it
becomes and, consequently, the less facilitative of self-preserva-
tion the system becomes. 1 4 A systemic failure to realize justice
9. Cf MICHAEL KING & CHRIS THORNHILL, NiL.As LUHMANN'S THEORY OF
POLITICS AND LAw 9 (2003) (explaining that "in very general terms, func-
tion[al] systems create order out of chaos").
10. See infra Part III.
11. See generally AnthonyJ. Colangelo, Absolute Conflicts ofLaw, 91 IND. L.J.
720 (2016) [hereinafter Colangelo, Conflict of Laws]; Anthony J. Colangelo,
Spatial Legality, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 69, 71-72 (2012) [hereinafter Colangelo,
Spatial Legality]. For this point as regards fragmentation specifically in the
investment arbitration context, see Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding Interna-
tional Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1049, 1083 (2012) (observing that "[b]oth investors and states (along
with the lawyers who advise them) also crave certainty and predictability.
Contracts become much easier for both sides to negotiate when they have a
clearer idea of the law that will apply.").
12. D'Amato, Groundwork, supra note 5, at 652-55.
13. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem ofJustice, 41
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 27, 27-28 (1977).
14. See KING & THORNHILL, supra note 9, at 41 (explaining that an inco-
herent legal system that pulls eclectically from various sources to decide dis-
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is therefore not merely an abstract philosophical defect;
rather, an unjust legal system that fails to productively guide
behavior cannibalizes itself from the inside out.
A major contribution the systems theory heuristic offers
international law, then, is a coherent account of not only what
international law is, but also where it comes from and where it
is going. And, perhaps most importantly of all, the account is
not just descriptive and predictive; it is also prescriptive in that it
supplies the moral imperative behind international law as
"law"15 that has thus far been lacking in most other accounts 16
(except for natural law accounts that have fallen largely into
desuetude). While systems theory is ordinarily used as a de-
scriptive tool for explaining how systems function without re-
gard to whether that functioning is good or bad,17 a systems
account of international law that preferences justice adds a dis-
tinct normative ingredient. Because the international legal sys-
tem's rules tilt toward trade and peace in the interest of self-
preservation and perpetuation,18 systems theory offers a con-
vex lens that promises to converge international law's frag-
mented rules upon a common, if distant, horizon. This ap-
proach colors what otherwise look like predominantly proce-
putes "will have ceased to be autopoietic and will therefore function in ex-
tremely erratic ways. It will no longer be able to produce the expectation-
stabilizing communications on which other systems in society depend."); id.
at 52-53 ("law's unique social function is, therefore, to stabilize normative
expectations over time" and "[1] aw allows at least for the possibility of expecta-
tions being based on established norms so that it is possible to anticipate
whether conduct will be legal or illegal, subject to the law or not subject to
the law").
15. I do not mean to suggest that, substantively speaking, morality and
law are the same or that law incorporates morality; rather, I mean only that
bestowing the label "law" on something tends to carry for society an added
imprimatur or weight that promotes obedience. While one might question
the practical value of even examining this question in domestic systems, it is
of immediate and far-reaching consequence for an international law that is
perennially under attack as not really law and the logical real-world corollary
that it therefore can, and should, be disregarded at will. See, e.g., PHILIP So-
PER, A THEORY OF LAW 3 (1984).
16. See supra note 6.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See Teubner, supra note 7, at 1-11; D'Amato, Groundwork, supra note
5 at 652-53.
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dural or "rule of law"19 justice principles, like equality and
predictability, with a subtle, but suffused, substantive hue.20
Yet at the same time, a systems account of international
law appears to trigger an immediate and intractable dilemma
with fragmentation-now safely a feature, not a bug, of the
modem international legal system.2 ' Namely, autopoiesis in-
sists that any major systemic development is born of self-pres-
ervation. Again, in the international legal context this means
fostering trade and peace through just rules predicated on
law's coherence.
Hence the intractable dilemma: systems theory prefer-
ences coherence while fragmentation destroys it. Accordingly
the two most salient ways of thinking about international law
today seem to be on a direct and inevitable collision course.
The task at hand is to try to reconcile them. As Dwight Eisen-
hower famously observed, "If a problem cannot be solved, en-
large it."22 And that's precisely what I aim to do by enlarging
analysis of fragmentation to include the counterfactual; that is,
what the world would look like absent not just fragmentation,
but also the key developments precipitating that fragmenta-
19. See infra Part III.
20. Of course an internally 'just" system of predictable and evenhanded
rules may nonetheless be comprised of substantively odious rules. But again,
that is empirically not true of the international legal system presently com-
prised of rules that tend to promote trade and peace. (As an aside, this
seems quite natural. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that an exceptionally
bottom-up legal system like international law, dependent as it is upon broad
acceptance among its subjects and with no overarching top-down lawmaking
or enforcing authority, would propagate-let alone sustain-a system of in-
tolerable rules.) As such, the normative point also does not succumb to the
naturalistic fallacy, or the argument that what is, should be. See STEVEN
PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 150(Penguin Books 2003) (2002) (describing the "naturalistic fallacy" as "the
belief that what happens in nature is good").
21. Tomer Broude, Keep Calm and Carry On: Martti Koskenniemi and the
Fragmentation of International Law, 27 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 279, 280-81(2013) ("Fragmentation in international law is now the norm, not the excep-
tion.").
22. See, e.g., Bonnie Brennan & Margaret Duffy, "If a Problem Cannot Be
Solved, Enlarge It": An Ideological Critique of the "Other" in Pearl Harbor and Sep-
tember 11 New York Times Coverage, in 4JouRNAUSM STUDIEs 3, 9 (2003). That
Eisenhower actually said this may be apocryphal. See E-mail from Valoise
Armstrong, Archivist, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, to author
(January 11, 2016, EST) (on file with author).
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tion. When one builds out the analysis in this way, I believe
systems theory can reveal fragmentation as a step in the evolu-
tion of the international legal system toward greater coher-
ence.
Boiled down, the argument is as follows. Fragmentation is
a product of the substantive expansion of international law
into new areas and the administrative and judicial expansion
of bodies purporting to make and apply it.23 The alternative is
for international law to remain frozen-capable of regulating
only what it traditionally regulated-and with only a limited
number of bodies to administer it. This alternative world
would necessarily leave everything else not covered by interna-
tional law to the opaque domestic jurisdictions of individual
states. But that would only raise the possibilities for disharmony
and conflict within the system because the variances among
different states' domestic laws promise to be greater than if
states and international regimes purported to apply the same
international law, albeit with slight (and maybe even signifi-
cant) variations. To put the point in colloquial but biological
terms, fragmentation may be a necessary and important grow-
ing pain that attends the international legal system's matura-
ton.
Analogically, international law's development in this re-
gard is not unlike what happens in the U.S. system when differ-
ent courts or circuits must interpret the same law. Even with-
out an ultimate arbiter of competing interpretations, for vari-
ous reasons the law naturally moves toward coherence.
Looking to the U.S. system may also address handwringing
that fragmentation irredeemably injures international law's
status as law. Just because different courts apply the same law
differently cannot in itself delegitimize that law, since this hap-
pens to be an inevitable feature of any legal system in which
law is administered by more than one institution. Again, even
within the highly interconnected and formalized judicial sys-
tems in the United States there are still all sorts of splits up
and down the judiciary on the same law. And while it is true
that there is a Supreme Court to resolve the most severe splits,
there are nonetheless many that go unresolved for long peri-
ods of time or even forever. Yet nobody would say that just
because a law is the subject of a circuit split it does not count,
23. ILC Report, supra note 1, 114.
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and function, as law. This dissonance among different courts
also does not disrupt the overall thesis. As explicated more be-
low, the argument is one of degrees, not absolutes: if law were
absolutely predictable and absolutely treated like cases alike, it
might never change or adapt to new circumstances. That in-
stantly contradicts autopoiesis, so it's not what I have in mind.
Rather, I have in mind coherence, which insists that law fol-
lows some consistent methodological path that may be pre-
dicted by actors. That different courts may interpret law differ-
ently may be an uneasy part of that progression-but if the
result is that the law, over time, both congeals and expands to
cover new ground, then what may seem like dissonance in the
moment may be greater coherence in the long run.
In sum, precisely because the world is becoming increas-
ingly interconnected, and different regulatory regimes increas-
ingly overlap, the potential for international conflicts of law is
large and only growing larger. Systems theory suggests that
when juxtaposed against the alternative of states retaining pa-
rochial regulatory authority over transnational activity under
their domestic laws, fragmentation may actually-if counterin-
tuitively-be an important step on the evolutionary path to-
ward the broader coherence and justness of the international
legal system.24
This Article begins by examining the phenomenon of
fragmentation and the consensus of resignation among schol-
ars that it has dashed all hopes of a coherent, unitary interna-
tional legal system. Next, the Article turns to the prevailing
view that the most attractive alternative for international law
going forward is some species of conflict of laws methodology
for managing (instead of resolving) international conflicts of
law.2 5 The Article then pushes against this trend. It explains
that conflict methodologies invariably involve tradeoffs in jus-
tice, and-more problematically-that while conflict method-
ologies may achieve a degree of coordination (as opposed to
coherence), they also entrench and institutionalize the very
justice tradeoffs they generate. Most seriously compromised
are elementary justice principles of equality and predictability.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.
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As to equality, almost by definition conflict methodologies
cannot treat like cases alike because they contemplate choos-
ing among multiple conflicting rules. More concretely, and as
will be elaborated,26 any decision-maker that chooses among
competing rules either fails to advance community prefer-
ences behind the rule not chosen or fails to treat like cases
alike. It should also come as no surprise that the more laws
that potentially may apply to one's conduct, the less predict-
able "the law," broadly conceived, becomes. These justice com-
promises are not just academic; they erode both a legal sys-
tem's legitimacy and its real-world efficacy at shaping behav-
ior.2 7 Practically speaking, how are transnational actors
supposed to conform their behavior to the law when their con-
duct is potentially governed by multiple conflicting rules?
Indeed, all three perspectives that this Article seeks to syn-
thesize and extract productive synergies from-fragmentation,
conflict of laws, and systems theory-acknowledge these same
basic justice problems. In fact, all three perspectives use the
same exact language to describe the justice problems. It is
moreover clear upon inspection that the terminological corre-
spondence is not just semantic coincidence: all three perspec-
tives also conceptualize and analyze justice the same way.28
The only difference is that fragmentation sparks the justice
problems, conflict of laws settles for them, and systems theory
seeks to solve them.
In that connection, this Article's discussion of systems the-
ory introduces key concepts and applies them to the interna-
tional legal system. It then suggests that systems theory may
offer a way past what has so far been an intransigent ideational
impasse blocking the ability to simultaneously conceive of in-
ternational law as a unitary system on the one hand, and the
firmly lodged and accelerating phenomenon of fragmentation
on the other. Viewing fragmentation as a transitional step to-
ward broader and deeper systemic coherence and robustness
sets it off from the alternative world in which international law
is paralyzed and the expanding universe of disputes it pres-
ently purports to cover are instead relegated to the domestic
jurisdictions of states.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part IV.
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Finally, and in service of the goal of coherence and the
justice principles it promotes, this Article proposes two meth-
odological tools for international legal decision-makers going
forward.29 Drawing from methods U.S. circuits use to foster
the coherence of federal law, it advances and illustrates
through case examples: (1) a presumption of coherence, and
(2) a presumption of catholicity. The presumption of coher-
ence's function is self-explanatory. The presumption of catho-
licity urges decision-makers to use all international legal
sources available to resolve disputes and acts as a bulwark
against parochial or idiosyncratic interpretations unmoored
from, and unguided by, the full spectrum of international le-
gal materials. The presumptions are mutually reinforcing in
that each presses decision-makers to consider both the reason-
ing and the results reached by other decision-makers on the
same or substantially similar legal issues.
This Article then tries to anticipate and explore critiques
its approach may provoke, with an emphasis on conflict meth-
ods' tested ability to manage multiple overlapping normative
commitments of different legal communities. The Article's co-
herence desideratum should not be misinterpreted as some
broadside on conflicts law or legal pluralism per se, which ob-
viously hold tremendous potential to handle conflicting legal
preferences. Rather, the argument more humbly wants to ac-
knowledge pluralism's cost to the consistency and predictabil-
ity of a law striving for uniformity and overall regulatory effi-
cacy. More precisely: When it comes to areas that have risen to
the level of international concern so as to qualify for regula-
tion by international law, coherence-not coordination-best
upholds the justice pillars central to international law's devel-
opment as a unitary system. And, ultimately, it is worth fight-
ing for. Systems theory supplies innovative conceptual and an-
alytical grounds on which the international legal system's de-
fenders can stand in that fight.
II. FRAGMENTATION DYNAMICS
Fragmentation manifests along diverse relational axes
among legal systems along which law's splintering may be plot-
ted and studied. For instance, it can be analyzed along hori-
29. See infra Part VI.
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zontal or vertical axes. Horizontal fragmentation presupposes
formally level legal power dynamics among coequal systems-
say, the several states in the U.S. legal system, or the world's
nation states in the international legal system. Vertical frag-
mentation, on the other hand, presupposes hierarchical legal
power dynamics between superordinate and subordinate sys-
tems-say, the U.S. federal government and a U.S. state, or,
one might even posit, international law and a. nation state. I
resist automatically pairing the nation state with an interna-
tional institution (instead sticking with term international law)
because determining if and when such institutions are authori-
tative expounders of international law is difficult and complex.
This last observation raises what is almost certainly the
most hotly-discussed type of fragmentation right now: frag-
mentation among different international legal bodies-in
their most acute form called "regime collisions" 30-resulting
from "the differentiation of global law into transnational legal
regimes, which define the external reach of their jurisdiction
along issue-specific rather than territorial lines, and which
claim a global validity for themselves."31 An emblematic exam-
ple-held out by the International Law Commission Report
on Fragmentation (ILC Report) to introduce the fragmenta-
tion phenomenon-involves precisely this type of collision be-
tween an arbitral tribunal set up under the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea, another dispute settlement body tasked
under the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Envi-
ronment of the North-East Atlantic, and the European Court
of Justice.32 Because these regimes tend to "claim a global va-
lidity for themselves" 33 at least within a particular jurisdictional
sliver of international law, fragmentation runs along a horizon-
tal, not a vertical, dynamic.
Take the conflicting views of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on the question of what degree of
control a state must exercise over actions by its armed forces
30. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime Collisions: The
Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 999, 1000-01 (2004).
31. Id. at 1009.
32. ILC Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 10-12.
33. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 30, at 1009.
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inside another state for it to incur legal responsibility for its
forces' activities. The ICJ articulated an "effective control" test,
under which "even the general control by [one state] over a
force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not ...
mean, without further evidence, that the [state] directed or
enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights
and humanitarian law" in another state so as to trigger legal
responsibility.34 In the context of the case originating the test,
the ICJ found that "United States participation, even if pre-
ponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training,
supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its mili-
tary or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of
its operation, is still insufficient in itself' to impute to the
United States responsibility for the contras' acts in Nicaragua
since " [s] uch acts could well be committed by members of the
contras without the control of the United States."3 5
By contrast, in evaluating the responsibility of Serbia-Mon-
tenegro for acts by the Bosnian-Serb militia in the former Yu-
goslavia, the ICTY explicitly rejected the ICJ's "effective con-
trol" test and adopted.a far less demanding "overall control"
test.3 6 The ICTY disposed of the need to show "instructions for
the specific acts contrary to international law" and instead pro-
vided that "equipping and financing" along with "coordinating
or helping in the general planning" of a military or paramili-
tary group is enough to trigger liability.3 7 As the ILC Report
noted, the ICTY did "not suggest 'overall control' to exist
alongside 'effective control' either as an exception to the gen-
eral law or as a special (local) regime governing the Yugoslav
conflict. It seeks to replace that standard altogether."3 8 In re-
sponse, the ICJ rejected the ICTY test in ruling on a dispute
that, coincidentally, grew directly out of the very events that
impelled the ICTY's existence in the Case Concerning Applica-
tion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
34. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 1 115 (June 27).
35. Id.
36. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 1 131 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
37. Id.
38. ILC Report, supra note 1, ¶ 50.
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of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) 39
and sought to reassert the hegemony of the ICJ "effective con-
trol" test in international law.40
Because neither of these bodies is formally superior to the
other, the dynamic between them is horizontal, not vertical, as
is the fragmentation of law their dynamic produces. It is also
symptomatic of a deeper fracturing of international law's edi-
fice; for here we have not just competing tests from different
courts, but also the possibility that the tests themselves may be
influenced by the different structures of the courts and the
different goals those structures address. 41 On the one hand is
the ICJ's jealous guardianship of state sovereignty, the court
being dependent as it is on the voluntary consent and funding
of states for its creation and continuity, as well as its "compe-
tence," or jurisdiction, being limited to disputes involving only
state parties. 42 On the other hand is the ICTY's chief focus on
promoting individual responsibility and redress for crimes
against international law and the court's relative freedom from
the need for state approval since it was created and is funded
by the United Nations acting through the Security Council. 43
Thus horizontal fragmentation is not limited to second-
order questions of interpretation by different interpretive bod-
ies. It may also extend to first-order questions about which
area of law prescribes the relevant rule to begin with when dif-
ferent areas create different competing standards, both of
39. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J.
Rep. 47, 11 396-401 (Feb. 26).
40. Id.
41. I discuss these different levels of fragmentation in more detail, infra
Part V, but thought it useful to introduce them here.
42. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, arts. 1, 34, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter Statute of the ICJ]; John R.
Crook, The International Court ofJustice and Human Rights, 1 Nw. U. J. INT'L
Hum. RTs. 2, 2 (2004) ("The only contentious cases the ICJ can hear are
cases between States. Individuals have no right of direct access. This is an
important difference between the ICJ and other human rights institutions
that allow some type of direct access. This limitation reflects the State-cen-
tered view of international law prevailing when the statute of the ICJ's prede-
cessor was drawn up after World War I.").
43. See S.C. Res. 827, annex, Statute of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 10 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter Statute of
the ICTY].
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which purport to represent the same governing rule. In the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, for example,
the ICJ concluded that two areas of law containing the right
not to be arbitrarily deprived of life-each providing a differ-
ent standard-applied to the same set of facts.4 4 The Court
found that both international human rights law, set out in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and inter-
national humanitarian law, or the laws of war, applied "in
times of war." 45 As with different interpretations of the law by
different bodies, this fragmentation dynamic between differ-
ent areas of law is horizontal 46 and its resolution, if any, does
not cleanly admit of a predetermined answer based on the su-
periority of one area over the other.
Implicit in horizontal fragmentation is the absence of a
hierarchy among international legal institutions capable of
resolving conflicts of international law(s)-that is, capable of
harmonizing international law itself. The apparently terminal
affliction for international law is that it simply cannot survive
as a coherent and unitary system.47 It is instead doomed to an
increasingly fragmented existence characterized by the pro-
gressive pixilation of its norms as they are hijacked by an ever
more autarkic cadre of special interests. 48 Indeed, so dire is
the condition that Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther
Teubner invoke Dante's admonition to those who enter the
44. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 1 25 (July 8).
45. Id. I evaluate the ICJ's attempt at reconciling these different areas of
law infra note 245.
46. With the caveat that it would not be horizontal if one of the rules was
regular customary or treaty-based international law and the other was a per-
emptory norm of international law or jus cogens. Interestingly, the question
in the Nuclear Weapons case, which involved what constitutes an "arbitrary
deprivation of life," arguably might be seen as a conflict of two peremptory
norms.
47. See generally Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 30.
48. Id. at 1017 (describing "autonomous legal regimes"); id. at, 1032
(describing an increasingly "heterarchical order of diverse autonomous re-
gimes"); ILC Report, supra note 1, 1 13 (describing the Commission's "focus
on the substantive question - the splitting up of the law into highly special-
ized 'boxes' that claim relative autonomy from each other and the general
law"); see also Martti Koskenniemi, Formalism, Fragmentation, Freedom: Kantian
Themes in Today's International Law, 4 No FOUND. 7, 11 (2007).
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gates of Hell to "lasciate ogni speranza,"49 or abandon every
hope.50
III. COHERENCE, COORDINATION, AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
Nonetheless, even among the most pessimistic of
prophets,5 1 there seems to be consensus that at least some
methodological promise resides in the intellectual traditions
of conflict of laws.52 The analogy is as straightforward as it is
imprecise: (1) horizontal conflicts among regimes correspond
to horizontal conflicts among states; (2) there is a venerable
and vigorous field of international law devoted to the latter;
49. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 31, at 1017.
50. Although the spelling in Fischer-Lescano and Teubner's discussion is
correct in modern Italian usage, their quotation is actually a little off from
the original text, which reads "Lasciate ogne speranza, voi ch'intrate'." Or,
"Abandon every hope, you who enter." DANTE ALIGHIERI, LA COMMEDIA: IN-
FERNO canto 3 1.9 (Bompiani 2000) (translated from the original by the au-
thor).
51. See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 30, at 1018 (describing as
a "guiding principle" for the way forward "[d] ecentralized modes of coping
with conflicts of laws as a legal method"); id. at 1021 (describing the need for
"the creation of new forms of collision rules, whose determination of the
applicable law would choose not between nations, but between functional
regimes. In their character as collision rules in the technical sense, however,
they would still work with the classical methods of conflicts law, and as such
would be required to decide between legal orders"); Broude, supra note 21,
at 284 (noting that "[o]ne might contest ... [a conflict of laws framework's]
specific applications, like any legal interpretation, but the remedial value of
utilizing this framework to address the issues raised by fragmentation will not
be contested").
52. ILC Report, supra note 1, ¶ 6 (observing "the need for a close analogy
with conflict of laws to deal with this type of fragmentation. This would be a
law regulating not conflicts between territorial legal systems, but conflicts
between treaty regimes."); Harlan Grant Cohen, From Fragmentation to Consti-
tutionalization, 25 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 381, 389 (2012)
("To the extent ... that we're talking about different legal communities, to
the extent these disputes go to questions about legitimate rulemaking-the
who and how of international law-the relationship between California law
and Jewish law is the better analogy. In such cases, there is no shared doc-
trine that might authoritatively resolve disputes between them. The gov-
erning framework in such situations is conflicts of law; resolving disputes
requires finding ways to mediate between the demands of different legal
communities.") (citations omitted); Cohen, supra note 11, at 1091; Ralf
Michaels &Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Tech-
niques in the Fragmentation of Public International Law, 22 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 349, 351, 367, 375-76 (2012).
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(3) therefore, we can look to that field for methodological so-
lutions to regime conflicts.53
The million-dollar question is how conflict of laws method-
ologies should adapt to handle regime conflicts-with the ILC
Report suggesting formal techniques grounded in the rules of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,54 others look-
ing to a relatively unorthodox (at least for contemporary ap-
proaches55 ) "substantive law approach" that would blend and
craft new substantive law out of competing rules or interpreta-
tions,5 6 and still others proposing that decision-makers assimi-
late other fora's decisions and reasoning when addressing the
same or substantially similar issues of international law.57
Yet before deciding upon a particular conflict of laws
methodology, a natural predicate inquiry might be: what are
the contours of the conflict of laws analogy in the first place?5 8
53. See ILC Report, supra note 1, 16 (noting Wilfried Jenks realization of
the need for utilizing this analogy).
54. Id. 1485; Broude, supra note 21, at 284, 287-90.
55. See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CON-
FLICT OF LAws 9 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining that the Roman praetorpereg7inus
charged with resolving choice of law issues "came up with the idea of craft-
ing an ad hoc substantive rule drawn from the laws of the involved states
rather than applying the law of one of those states. Thus, for the first time,
multistate disputes were resolved not through a choice of law, but rather
through the creation and application of a special body of substantive law
applicable only to those disputes.").
56. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 30, at 1021-23.
57. See Andrea K. Bjorklund & Sophie Nappert, Beyond Fragmentation, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: IN MEMORIAM THOMAS
WALDE 439 (Todd Weiler & Freya Baetens eds., 2011). As Part V elaborates, I
too find both purchase and promise in the idea of decisional cross-fertiliza-
tion. Indeed, I argue that the systems theory advanced in this project pro-
vides innovative yet persuasive support for such a view. Moreover, the tools
proposed in Part V not only draw for their creation from the systems theory
view; they also seek to illustrate for, and supply, real-world decision-makers
going forward with precise and concrete "coherence methods" (as opposed
to conflict methods), to use in advancing international law's systemic coher-
ence through decisional cross-fertilization in resolving disputes. See infra Part
V.
58. To be sure, commentators invariably acknowledge that there are dif-
ferences. See Fisher-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 30, at 1018, 1021;
Broude, supra note 21, at 284. But extensive exploration of those differences
as well as the similarities employed to discern the analogy's contours tends to
be rare. For a notable and very insightful exception, see Michaels &
Pauwelyn, supra note 52.
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Only after carefully investigating the similarities and differ-
ences between the systems that conflict of laws approaches ad-
dress, and the systems that fragmentation purportedly propa-
gates, can we arrive at an adequately sophisticated understand-
ing of how-conceptually and methodologically-to shape
responsive solutions.
Addressing this inquiry, Ralf Michaels and Joost Pauwelyn
insightfully argue that collisions among international bodies
do not cleanly lend themselves to conventional conflict meth-
odologies for a number of reasons.5 9 A "traditional approach"
to conflict of laws is a poor fit because the traditional connect-
ing factors-geographic territory and domicile-used to de-
termine the applicable law, are lacking.60 Put another way, be-
cause by definition international law applies everywhere and to
everyone, if a dispute falls within multiple regimes' overlap-
ping subject matter jurisdictions, hinging the choice of law (or
regime) on where an activity took place or whom it involved is
nonsensical.61 A "governmental interest approach" similarly
relies on hallmarks of statehood that do not smoothly translate
to regime conflicts because it "assumes the coexistence of two
governments whose interests are in question and potentially in
conflict," whereas international lawmaking presupposes "at
least in theory, the same government or 'lawmaker.' "
62
Michaels and Pauwelyn note that a "functional approach"
likely carries the best fit for regime conflicts.63 Yet there are
still meaningful differences; most indicative for present pur-
poses is that a functional approach selects one law over an-
other to achieve "coordination" among discrete systems, while
a functional approach within a single system selects one law
over another to achieve "coherence" within that same sys-
59. Michaels & Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 360-62.
60. Id. at 361.
61. Cf Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International
"False Conflict" of Laws, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 881, 883 (2009) ("The prescrip-
tive reach of universal jurisdiction is not really extraterritorial at all; but
rather comprises a comprehensive territorial jurisdiction, originating in a
universally applicable international law that covers the globe. Individual
States may apply and enforce that law in domestic courts, to be sure, but its
prescriptive scope encompasses all territory subject to international law, i.e.,
the entire world.").
62. Michaels & Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 361.
63. Id. at 362.
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tem. 64 The former more readily disregards the regulatory
force of the law not chosen as inapplicable because it pertains
to an inapplicable body of law, while the latter more readily
acknowledges the residual applicability of the law not chosen
because while it is inapplicable on the precise issue before the
court, it is still part of the same body of governing law.
This distinction-between striving for coordination on
the one hand and for coherence on the other-is vital to
whether international law is a unitary system because, if it is,
we can expect it to move toward coherence, notjust coordina-
tion.65 And this movement is not only predictive; it also fur-
nishes a normative basis on which to assess the nature and de-
velopment of international law. For their part, Michaels and
Pauwelyn eschew the normative or "ontological" question of
whether international law is a unitary system and focus instead
on "technical" solutions to regime conflicts by carefully bor-
rowing context-specific techniques from inter- and intra-sys-
tem conflict rules. 66 In so doing, they demonstrate that the
64. Id.
65. See id. at 362. It is not feasible to fully explore all the various conflict
methods that have been proposed to address fragmentation-a topic that by
itself could easily fill a book. But it is worth noting that to the extent some of
them aim also at coherence, and not just coordination, they fit with this
Article's theory. For instance, some of the ILC Report techniques, although
arrived at by formal treaty interpretation, nonetheless comport in principle
with the more organic common law tools suggested later in this Article.
Techniques like lex specialis, or that specialized law applies over general law,
see, for example, ILC Report, supra note 1, 1 56, and lex posterior, or that later
law applies over earlier law, id. 1225, can and do work within a single system.
An initial difference between these formal techniques and the methods this
Article proposes derives from the different traditions the works draw from.
While the ILC Report draws from a civil law tradition that embraces conflict of
laws rules for picking one rule over another, this Article's approach is more
common-law and synthesis oriented. As Parts V and VI set out to show in
some detail, I think the common law approach is more in keeping with, and
facilitative of, systemic coherence and has certain doctrinal and practical ad-
vantages, an almost preliminary one being that it does not threaten to mire
decision-makers in unhelpful methodological morasses. Indeed, the ILC Re-
port itself notes the difficult questions raised by the lex specialis' actual appli-
cation in cases, and "[i]n this sense, the lex specialis maxim cannot be mean-
ingfully codified," id. 1 119, and cites similar problems with lex posteior. Id.1 241. See also infra note 245 (discussing the ICJ's Nuclear Weapons opinion).
66. See Michaels & Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 352.
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techniques can be used to manage conflicts in a coordinated
way even if the techniques do not resolve them.67
This Article takes up the question of whether interna-
tional law is a system and casts its exploration of the question
somewhat differently from the existing literature. The Part be-
low starts by expressing hesitancy that conflict of laws methods
should be pursued as the best solution to fragmentation-pre-
cisely because conflict cases manifest the very same insoluble
evils that purportedly haunt fragmentation. For conflict meth-
ods endemically enlist compromises in justice to placate those
evils, not banish them. Poetically speaking, I am not yet ready
to "abandon every hope."
IV. JUSTICE ACROSS THREE REALMS
As the term conflict of laws conveys, the field addresses
conflicts among competing legal systems whose laws poten-
tially regulate the same dispute. Although the discipline
clearly has prevented descent into anarchy among the world's
legal systems, it also has generated enduring and seemingly in-
curable dilemmas for the law. Here I do not wish to sound
overly critical of the field of conflict of laws. In line with the
Article's overall argument style, what follows is an argument of
degrees, not absolutes. So to be clear, I am not saying that con-
flict of laws methodologies themselves make law incoherent;
quite the opposite, their purpose is to foster some degree of
coherence in coordinating multiple separate legal systems pur-
porting to regulate the same activity. In that respect, they have
undoubtedly been successful, to a degree. Rather, the point is
that when compared with the alternative of a single unified
legal system, a multistate (or multi-regime) system of conflict-
ing overlapping laws is less coherent because it is less predict-
able and less able to treat like cases alike.
The chief dilemma conflict methodologies present is the
inevitable tradeoff between principles that cut to what Arthur
von Mehren called the "primordial" problem of justice. 68 By
their very nature, conflict cases are harder to justly resolve,
and thereby pose a greater threat to law's ability to function
effectively-precisely because, like fragmentation, they impair
67. Id. at 362-74.
68. von Mehren, supra note 13, at 27-28.
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"the coherent functioning of legal systems."69 Justice is funda-
mental to law because, in von Mehren's words, "[r]ules and
institutions perceived as unjust are unstable and ultimately un-
acceptable. Justice is a complex concept: like cases should be
treated alike; the legal consequences that attach to conduct
should be understandable and foreseeable. Rules and institu-
tions must also express and advance values and purposes ac-
cepted by the community."7 0
The correspondence to the ILC Report's recent conclu-
sions on fragmentation is striking: "Fragmentation puts to
question the coherence of international law. Coherence is val-
ued positively owing to the connection it has with predictabil-
ity and legal security. Moreover, only a coherent legal system
treats its subjects equally."7 1 Jonathan Charney similarly ob-
served that fragmentation raises "the question ... whether the
proliferation of international tribunals threatens the coher-
ence of the international legal system" because "[n]ot only
may a cacophony of views on the norms of international law
undermine the perception that an international legal system
exists, but if like cases are not treated alike, the very essence of
a normative system of law will be lost."7 2 Conflict cases put
great pressure on the justice principles-or what some might
call "rule of law"73 principles-of predictability, advancing
community values, and equality, treating like cases alike. In-
deed, most conflict cases end up invariably sacrificing one
principle at the altar of another.
As to predictability, a multiplicity of potentially applicable
laws makes it harder to predict both which law will apply to
one's behavior and the legal consequences of that behavior.
And to the very likely extent that the applicable law turns on
where suit is initiated, it may even catch the defendant by sur-
prise, triggering serious fairness concerns.7 4 All of which un-
dermines predictability and therefore threatens both the sta-
69. Id. at 28.
70. Id. at 27-28.
71. ILC Report, supra note 1, 1 491.
72. Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the
Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697,
699 (1999).
73. See Colangelo, Conflict of Laws, supra note 11, at 766-70 (explaining
rule of law criteria in relation to conflict of laws issues).
74. Colangelo, Spatial Legality, supra note 11, at 77-104.
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bility and the efficacy of the law.7 5 As to advancing community
values and equal treatment that "like cases should be treated
alike,"'7 6 one of these two justice principles will always
subordinate itself to the other in true conflict cases.77 Unlike
in wholly domestic cases in which a community's preferences
simultaneously can be advanced via application of its law and
that law treats like cases alike, in true conflict cases one of
these justice goals invariably gives way.7 8
Take for instance a typical conflict case involving parties
from different states whose laws conflict. If the forum applies
forum law to the foreign party, it advances its own values ex-
pressed in its law and treats like cases before it alike; but it
subordinates the values of the foreigner's home community.
If, on the other hand, the forum applies foreign law it ad-
vances the foreign community's values as to its own inhabitant,
but fails to treat like cases alike (since other cases with similar
or identical facts presumably would be decided under forum
law). The same tradeoff occurs where one element of the dis-
pute takes place in one state and another element takes place
in another state. The only way around this zero-sum game is
where there is what's called a "false conflict" of laws; that is,
foreign law and forum law are the same-a situation that
would also quell predictability problems.79 But for cases in
which there is an actual conflict of laws, these justice problems
are endemic. They are also transferable to conflicts of interna-
tional law, whether among states or international bodies.80
75. Id. at 71-72 ("[I]f people cannot predict how law will treat their be-
havior, law in turn loses legitimacy and effectiveness as a tool for shaping
behavior. Put another way, the less I am able to predict how the law will treat
my behavior, the less incentive I have to conform my behavior to the law. It
follows that how the law does end up treating my behavior is going to be
arbitrary, chipping away at law's legitimacy over time.").
76. von Mehren, supra note 13, at 27.
77. "True conflict" cases are distinguished from "false conflict" cases, dis-
cussed immediately below.
78. von Mehren, supra note 13, at 30.
79. For my analyses of how false conflicts can be used to handle cases
involving international law, see Colangelo, supra note 61, and Anthony J.
Colangelo, International Law in U.S. State Courts: Extraterritoriality and "False
Conflicts" of Law, 48 INT'L L. 1 (2014).
80. To illustrate, posit the popular example of a conflict between the
World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) on access to pharmaceuticals and intellectual property rights. The
conflicting interpretations make less predictable which international law will
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
212016]
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
Thus importing conflict of laws methodologies for managing,
instead of resolving, fragmentation issues may only further en-
sconce the evils that fragmentation purportedly generates. It
may be that managing the conflicts is all that international law
can do at this point; a sort of least-worst option. But I hesitate
to think this is a foregone conclusion.
Nonetheless, we appear to be at an ideational impasse.
Fragmentation is now the norm, not the exception. And by all
accounts it has been doused with strong accelerant.81 If frag-
mentation cannot be "solved" in the sense of rolling it back or
halting it, then maybe managing it is, in fact, the least-worst
option. Here is where systems theory, explicated more be-
low,8 2 may energize the legal imagination. As noted, if interna-
tional law is viewed as a unitary system it can be expected to
strive toward coherence over time.83
Joining systems theory with fragmentation may be at once
paradoxical and auspicious because, in their quest for coher-
ence, autopoietic legal systems promote predictability and
equality-exactly the justice principles with which fragmenta-
tion and conflict of laws methods seem to struggle so futilely.
Moreover, systems theory thinking and terminology about jus-
tice correspond neatly to the thinking and terminology aboutjustice in both conflict of laws and fragmentation discussions.
In short, across all three ways of thinking-conflict of laws,
fragmentation, and systems theory-justice is a critical linch-
pin to a legal system's coherence and is defined and conceptu-
alized in the same way.
Pioneering systems theorist Niklas Luhmann included an
entire chapter on "Justice" in his seminal work, Law as a Social
System, emphasizing it as a principle that undergirds "the unity
of the system."84 As in both conflict of laws thinking and frag-
mentation thinking, for Luhmann, "U] ustice . . . in its most
general form has traditionally, and still today, been identified
with equality,"85 or "the need for consistent decision-making" to
apply and the differing values of the differing international communities
present a variation on the tradeoff between advancing one set of values at
the expense of another and treating like cases alike.
81. See Broude, supra note 21, at 280-81.
82. Infra Part V.
83. See supra Part I.
84. NuuAs LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 213 (2004).
85. Id. at 217.
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promote "an internal legal norm ofjustice, that is, the require-
ment to treat like cases alike." 86 A justice-enhancing corollary
that cuts straight to predictability is that like cases are treated
alike according to law's own recursive process of building up a
network of rules and precedent over time so that parties have a
reasonable expectation of, and do not have to guess anew each
time a case arises, how their behavior will be assessed by the
legal system.87 Thus systems theory predicts that if interna-
tional law is a unitary system, it will lean toward justice as char-
acterized by equality and predictability, and thereby strive to-
ward coherence over the long run.
This is only a prediction, but it breaks through the idea-
tional impasse by offering new theoretical grounds on which
to make a hypothesis. Namely, if the international legal system
evolves toward coherence propelled by justice principles of
equality and predictability, it looks like a unitary system. To
round out the hypothesis, all we need to do is rearrange the
typical order of argument in legal scholarship, which tends to
proceed from the descriptive (this is how things are) to the
predictive (this is how things will be) to the normative (this is
how things ought to be).*88
Instead of that order, one could begin with the predictive
and reverse course into the descriptive. The analysis would
look something like this: as a system, international law will and
should evolve toward coherence. This evolution, in turn, dem-
onstrates international law is a system. Here we have an (ad-
86. Id. at 60.
87. Id. at 168, 248-49. This corollary is not necessary or predicate to
treating like cases alike. For instance, the norm for deciding cases could sim-
ply be that whoever has the best ad hoc or ad hominem argument wins, in
which case while parties may know in advance how the law will assess the
dispute, they will have little expectation about how the law will assess their
behavior.
88. M6nica Garcia-Salmones Rovira, Who Is the System? On Commitment,
Biology, and Human Beings in the Politics of "Groundwork for International Law, "
108 Am. J. INT'L L. 689, 695 (2014) ("Indeed, for much of twentieth-century
scholarship, taking the view that international law was a unified system ini-
tially called for a leap of faith that enabled lawyers-generally speaking, pro-
gressive lawyers-to see a single whole where the majority saw mere 'spots'
of external law of the state subjected to what was thought to be prevalent
internal law.").
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mittedly circular8 9) hypothesis, but one that either will be
borne out or will not. Another way to analyze the question of
systemic coherence is to try to imagine the counterfactual,
which would include not just fragmentation of international
law itself but also the reasons for that fragmentation. If frag-
mentation is a product of international law spreading into new
areas and the proliferation of bodies purporting to apply it,90
what would the world look like absent those developments?
The critical follow-up question being: which world looks more
conducive to the success of international law, with "success"
meaning fostering robustness that can withstand shocks that
threaten to take down the system?91
The next two Parts try to flesh out these alternatives. Part
V describes systems theory and its justice principles and ap-
plies them to international law to show that conflict methodol-
ogies may not be the best option in the long run. Part VI ex-
plores the counterfactual through a breakdown in the conflict
of laws analogy that has largely escaped systematic analysis and
that may portend major jurisprudential and methodological
implications for confronting fragmentation going forward.
Namely, in conflict cases, decision-makers are tasked with
choosing among different laws from different legal systems; in
fragmentation cases, by contrast, decision-makers are tasked
with interpreting what purports to be the same law within,
broadly speaking, the same legal system-albeit a general sys-
tem composed of multiple discrete constituent systems. Over-
looking this analogical breakdown overlooks a wealth of data
presently residing in another horizontal fragmentation dy-
namic: fragmentation of international law among states. This
dynamic mingles key characteristics of the systemic structures
conventional conflict analysis is designed to manage-a system
89. Cf Teubner, supra note 7, at 1 ("Legal autopoiesis breaks a taboo in
legal thinking-the taboo of circularity. Legal doctrine, legal theory and le-
gal sociology have all regarded circularity as a subject not to be broached.
Circular arguments have been viewed as petitio principii forbidden by the iron
law of legal logic. Legal autopoiesis now presumes to invalidate this iron law
by transferring circularity from the world of ideas to that of hard facts."). In
law, it is like saying that justification according to law is legal justification.
This is not only true in international law, but it also true of nations' munici-
pal laws.
90. See generally ILC Report, supra note 1, 11 7-10, 82-101.
91. See infra Part V.
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of separate coequal states with their own separate laws-with
key characteristics of the systemic structures regime conflicts
exhibit-a system of separate institutional bodies purporting
to interpret and apply the same law. As such, it may represent,
and profitably be studied as, an intermediate step between
conventional conflicts of law and international conflicts of law.
Analyzing the fragmentation of international law among states
may also suggest better methodologies for resolving fragmen-
tation issues than the usual outfit of conflict approaches calcu-
lated to achieve only coordination, not coherence.
V. SYSTEMS THEORY AND FRAGMENTATION
A natural way to introduce systems theory is to define at
the outset what a system is. We can then move quickly from the
abstract to the concrete to arrive at a workable definition of
the international legal system and hypothesize what that might
mean for the future of fragmentation. A system, generally
speaking, is a group of interactive elements distinct from its
larger environment that operates according to its own internal
logic. 92 The human body, for example, is a system: "[r]ather
than reducing an entity (e.g. the human body) to the proper-
ties of its parts or elements (e.g. organs or cells), systems the-
ory focuses on the arrangement of and relations between the
parts which connect them into a whole (cf. holism) ."" In this
sense, a central characteristic is that "the collective behavior of
[the system's] parts together is more than the sum of their
individual behaviors"94 and thus the system "is different from,
and perhaps greater than, the sum of its parts."95 And because
the body's system, to continue the example, operates accord-
ing to its own internal (biological) logic in the reproduction of
its cells, and hence itself, over time, it is also autopoietic-it
strives toward self-perpetuation. 96
92. See DONELLA H. MEADOws, THINKING IN SYSTEMs: A PRIMER 2 (Diana
Wright ed., 2009).
93. THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 898 (Robert Audi ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2nd ed. 1999).
94. Mark E.J. Newman, Complex Systems: A Survey, 79 AM.J. OF PHYSICS 800,
800 (2011).
95. D'Amato, International Law, supra note 5, at 345.
96. MEADOWs, supra note 92, at 3 ("We are complex systems-our own
bodies are magnificent examples of integrated, interconnected, self-main-
taining complexity.").
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This process, again generated by the system's internal
logic, is recursive; it is a "circular . .. self-referential mode of
operation"97 of repeat behavior through which the system
both self-realizes and "emerges" from its constituent ele-
ments.9 8 It may be "open" in its performance of this process,
taking inputs from, and emitting outputs to, its environment;
or it may be "closed," sealed off from its environment.99 Or,
most likely, it may be open or closed depending on the func-
tion at issue. 100 (As we will see, whether to think of the interna-
tional legal system as open or closed also depends on which
function of the system one focuses.) To use again the body as
an example, it eats and drinks to sustain itself. But that food
and drink are processed differently according to that biologi-
cal system's unique constitution. What I intake may affect me
differently than what you intake, not to mention how the same
exact intake affects a dog. In very general terms, "f[t] he system,
to a large extent, causes its own behavior! An outside event
may unleash that behavior, but the same outside event applied
to a different system is likely to produce a different result."101
Before transitioning to legal systems, and the interna-
tional legal system in particular, intellectual care demands a
cautious word on the uses to which the present analysis seeks
to put systems theory. As Luhmann observed, "[a] mere anal-
ogy ... would miss the mark, as would a merely metaphorical
97. Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 136, 137
(1989); see also Baxter, supra note 4, at 1994 ("The legal system, as an auto-
poietic system of communication, is a recursive, self-referential, self-produc-
ing, self-reproducing, and self-describing system").
98. See Teubner, supra note 7, at 3-4 ("[L]egal autopoiesis is brought
about only if an emergent element of the legal system is created"); see also
D'Amato, International Law, supra note 5, at 345 ("'Emergence' is a useful
term in the study of systems. An organic system emerges from a collection of
live cells."); Newman, supra note 94, at 800 ("The collective behaviors are
sometimes called 'emergent' behaviors, and a complex system can thus be
said to be a system of interacting parts that displays emergent behavior.").
99. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, The Theory of Open Systems in Physics and Biol-
ogy, 111 SCIENCE 23, 23 (1950) ("A system is closed if no material enters or
leaves it; it is open if there is import and export and, therefore, change of
the components. Living systems are open systems, maintaining themselves in
exchange of materials with environment, and in continuous building up and
breaking down of their components.").
100. For an in-depth explanation of this "operative closure" in relation to
the system's environment, see LUHMANN, supra note 84, at 76-141.
101. MEADOwS, supra note 92, at 2.
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transfer of biological terms to sociology [or law]."102 Rather,
biological metaphors of autopoiesis might be conscientiously
used, to quote German legal theorist Hubert Rottleuthner, to
"explicate a concept of law which would enable hitherto dispa-
rate elements of legal theory to be integrated or seen in an-
other light, thereby leading to fruitful questioning," and to en-
large thinking about "evolutionary theory" of the law in order
to reinterpret existing thinking. 03 And that is how this Article
seeks to use systems theory metaphors here: as heuristics that
may aid thinking about how to conceptualize the seemingly
increasingly disparate elements of international law and legal
theory and to reinterpret discussions of international law's
evolution.
Thus, the international legal system obviously is not di-
rectly analogous to a biological system like the human body.1 0 4
Instead, Anthony D'Amato explains, the international legal
system is "an emergent property of an assortment of rules,
norms, and principles that, in interacting with those norms,
recursively imposes a meaningful organization upon them." 05
The open nature of the system allows it to shape those norms
through various inputs from its environment. When a real
world dispute transforms into a claim that the international
legal system recognizes as "legal," it becomes an input that is
processed according to the system's internal logic.1 06 The
claim's resolution and its dissemination back into the real
world is the resulting output, which the system then incorpo-
rates into its body of rules, norms, and principles.107 The
recursive nature of this process adds to the overall body of in-
ternational law. In the converse, if there were no such thing as
law (or if law unambiguously covered everything within a
102. Luhmann, supra note 97, at 137.
103. Hubert Rottleuthner, Biological Metaphor in Legal Thought, in AUTO-
POIETIc LAw: A NEw APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 7, at 97, 114.
104. Although anthropomorphizing the states that make up the system is
of course ubiquitous, if sometimes problematic. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster,
Unpacking the State's Reputation, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 231 (2009).
105. D'Amato, International Law, supra note 5, at 346-47.
106. Id.
107. This process of input, output, and effect on the system has from early
on been referred to as a "feedback loop." See DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANAL-
vsis or POLITICAL LIFE 29-32 (1965).
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closed system' 0 ), no longer would there be legal disputes.
Precisely because law spawns issues as it resolves them, "[t]he
law itself creates the conflicts that it needs for its own evolu-
tion, and thereby perfects itself." 09 Law thus fosters a synergic
relationship with its environment to engineer an increasingly
robust network of norms that not only resolve real world dis-
putes but also shore up the legal system's existence.1 10
Embedded in the description above is what systems litera-
ture calls coding: the system assigns certain values to the in-
puts.11 ' A legal system generally performs two separate coding
operations that ordinarily take binary form." 2 First, an almost
preliminary coding assignment is whether a claim is a recog-
nizable legal input to begin with; that is, whether to code it as
legal at all (the binary being legal/not-legal)."1 3 It could in-
stead be political, economic, scientific, cultural, religious, or
artistic. None of these other fields can tell if a dispute is legal.
Only law, through its own identification processes, can make
that call. In this way, a legal system defines its own boundaries
and mediates the borders between itself and its environ-
ment.11 4 Thus while the international legal system exhibits an
open interaction with its environment, it is also closed in that
108. Cf Niklas Luhmann, Closure and Openness: On Reality in the World of
Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAw: A NEW APPROACH To LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note
7, at 335 ("A system can reproduce itself only in an environment. If it were
not continually irritated, stimulated, disturbed and faced with changes in the
environment, it would after a short time terminate its operations, cease its
autopoiesis.").
109. Luhmann, supra note 97, at 148; Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the
Legal System, in AUTOPOIETIC LAw, A NEW APPROACH To LAW AND SOCIETY,
supra note 7, at 28. It does so by making itself more robust. D'Amato ex-
plains that "[r]obustness is defined as the ability to withstand unanticipated
shocks or attacks upon the system. International law has become increasingly
robust over the centuries so that today it is able to survive numerous viola-
tions of its norms and prominent challenges to their validity." D'Amato, In-
ternational Law, supra note 5, at 337-38.
110. D'Amato, International Law, supra note 5, at 337-38.
111. The process by which this coding occurs is typically referred to as
"programming." See LUHMANN, supra note 84, at 17.
112. According to the literature. At least one strong thinker has tried to
expand these coding options. See D'Amato, International Law, supra note 5, at
348.
113. Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, supra note 109, at 20.
114. Id.; see also Baxter, supra note 4, at 1993, 2067.
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it, and only it, can decide what qualifies as a legal claim in the
first place.115
Next, once the input qualifies as distinctively legal, law's
second-order coding kicks in with another binary assignment
that goes to the lawfulness of what is being alleged; that is, is it
"lawful or "unlawful"? Luhmann explains:
[A]s a closed system, the law is completely autono-
mous at the level of its own operations. Only the law
can say what is lawful and unlawful, and in deciding
this question it must always refer to the results of its
own operations and to the consequences for the sys-
tem's future operations. In each of its own operations
it has to reproduce its own operational capacity. It
achieves its structural stability through this recursivity
and not, as one might suppose, through favorable in-
put or worthy output.116
Adapting this coding operation to the international legal
system, D'Amato somewhat heretically 17 expands the coding
options to better resonate with international law's uniquely de-
centralized anatomy. In his view, "[w]hen the ILS [Interna-
tional Legal System] outputs a code (makes a decision), the
coding does not have to be binary in the sense insisted upon in
the literature on systems. It suffices for the ILS to code some
inputs as 'illegal' and say nothing about the rest."118 Instead,
115. KING & THORNHILL, supra note 9, at 41 ("Law, in short, is the legal
system; it is a system of communications which identifies itself as law and is
able to distinguish between those communications which are part of itself
and those which are not.").
116. Luhmann, supra note 97, at 139. For a more specific illustration as to
courts, Baxter explains: "For example, when a court communicates ajudicial
decision, it typically relies on past legal communications, such as prior deci-
sions, and in so doing is creates connective possibilities for future legal com-
munications. In this recursive process, the system reproduces itself as a net-
work of system-specific communications." Baxter, supra note 4, at 2006.
117. Conventional systems accounts-including as applied to law-uni-
formly use binary codes. D'Amato's "not-illegal" coding does not look like
Luhmann's "third value," or something in addition to law, which he warns
would break down the system; but it may approach Luhmann's warning
against "degrees (half-legal)," which he also sees as problematic. See
LUHMANN, supra note 84, at 12.
118. D'Amato, International Law, supra note 5, at 348.
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the system "stores [the not-illegal outputs] in memory," possi-
bly to be recruited later on to help resolve future disputes. 119
Herein lies a basic constitutional disparity between inter-
national law and all other top-down legal systems typified by
autarkic hierarchies that definitively may resolve disputes and,
by so doing, keep them within law's distinct universe of legal
(as opposed to political, economic, etc.) communications.12 0
Unlike these other legal systems, the international legal system
"processes real-world controversies directly, taking into ac-
count their context and possible settlement." 1 2 1 The short of it
is that-more than other legal systems which can be rescued
by an external power structure should their operational capac-
ities fail-the international legal system has a hard-wired, dy-
namic, and indeed existential drive to preserve itself. For this
very reason, "international law strives to protect itself by favor-
ing claims that promote systemic order while coding as 'illegal'
those claims that point toward anarchy and the death of the
legal system." 122 From a systems view at least, a sweet irony is
that what many challenge as not really law may actually be the
"fittest" and most stable legal system the world has ever known,
able to withstand massive shocks to its system, including two
World Wars, and still survive-precisely because its existence
does not depend on the whim of a top-down governance struc-
ture that may fall through revolution, war, or other exigency.
As we have already seen, systemic order preferences jus-
tice in the form of equality and predictability. Justice here is
not what systems literature would call a "third value,"1 23 or an
added consideration on top of the codes legal and illegal.
Rather, justice is an internal trait of the legal system resulting
from its recursive operations (and devoid of particular sub-
stantive content). The system's internal logic by nature fosters
119. Id. at 352.
120. Luhmann, supra note 97, at 139. Indeed, Luhmann seems to assume
that the basic organizing principle underlying the unity of law today is the
nation state. Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, supra note 109, at 12
(explaining that "the unity of knowledge has now been replaced by the unity
of state and nation").
121. D'Amato, International Law, supra note 5, at 360.
122. Id. at 342.
123. LUHMANN, supra note 84, at 212.
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predictability and equality through "an internal legal norm of
justice, that is, the requirement to treat like cases alike."1 24
Naturally the system must determine what is alike and
what is unalike, and therefore it is more complete to speak of
"the unity of the [legal] system requir[ing] that the same be
treated the same and the different be treated differently, so
that the unity [is] expressed by the difference between the same
and different."125 In other words, as any first-year law student
learns, the system analogizes and differentiates. This furthers
the system's long-term stability "in the sense of dynamic stabil-
ity, that is, continuation of the autopoietic, structurally deter-
mined reproduction" 1 2 6 of law as it expands by generating and
resolving new disputes. The international legal system's pur-
suit of dynamic stability exhibits these same mechanics, albeit
in a less centralized form. More to the point, an unprece-
dented boom of transnational activity has triggered overlap-
ping avalanches of novel disputes that the system has hurried
to input. But in its coding haste, the system catalyzed the frag-
mentation of its norms.' 27
And because fragmentation is largely a product ofjudicial
or quasi-judicial international legal development 28 a fertile
example of law's recursive incorporation and rule adjustment
for present purposes is the common law. For the common law
also has grown organically and heartily to handle myriad ad-
vancements of the modern world and "above all, has devel-
oped a careful, theoretically reflected culture of 'rationes
decidendi' as a consequence of its principle of binding prece-
dent."129 Argument is by analogy; like cases are treated alike
and unlike cases are treated unalike. Ad hoc and ad hominem
arguments are out of bounds130 since they do not obey law's
recursive constitution in a way that nurtures justice's criteria.
At the level of legal ontogenesis, the common law is accord-
ingly an apt referent for conceptualizing fragmentation's in-
teraction with systems theory. And it indicates that conflict of
laws models may actually endanger the international legal sys-
124. Id. at 60.
125. Id. at 218.
126. Id. at 232.
127. See generally, ILC Report, supra note 1.
128. See e.g., the examples discussed supra in Part I.
129. LUHMANN, supra note 84, at 228.
130. Id. at 168, 248-49.
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tem's coherence by institutionalizing a degree of inequality
and arbitrariness that compromises justice.13 1
In short, systems theory predicts that a unified interna-
tional legal system will promote coherence through inbuiltjus-
tice principles of equality and predictability and will pursue
this goal via a process of analogy and differentiation akin to
common law decision-making. But prevailing proposals to em-
brace conflict of laws methods in order to fight fragmentation
by nature arrest this project from the outset. The salient ques-
tion then becomes: is there another approach that does not
methodically forfeitjustice pillars of equality and predictability
so conducive to the unitary system's coherence and long term
survival?
The next Part argues that the seeds of such an approach
may be found in the horizontal fragmentation dynamic of dif-
ferent courts seeking harmonization of international law
through common law adjudication. Just as developments in
travel and technology catalyzed the common law's evolution,
albeit with some growing pains, developments in transnational
travel and technology catalyzed international law's evolution,
albeit with some growing pains-most pertinent for our pur-
poses being fragmentation. Yet the alternative for both the
common law and international law is a snowballing universe of
contentious and perhaps even catastrophic disputes pushed
outside the realm of law or, at the very least in the transna-
tional context, left to the opaque domestic jurisdictions of the
multiple states implicated. A conflict approach would both
promote and entrench this disharmony of law within the sys-
tem. Moreover, if conflicts models are to be the solution, we
would be well advised to recall their true origins: comity,13 2 or
not really law at all. Thus at bottom, conflict approaches prom-
ise only to turn the escalating frequency and importance of
131. Supra Part III.
132. ULRICH HUBER, DE CONFLICTU LEGUM DIVERSARUM IN DIVERsIs IMPER-
us, reproduced in Ernest Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L.
REv. 375, 376 (1919) ("1. The laws of each state have force within the limits
of that government and bind all subjects to it, but not beyond. 2. All persons
within the limits of a government, whether they live there permanently or
temporarily, are deemed to be subjects thereof. 3. Sovereigns will so act by
way of comity that rights acquired within the limits of a government retain
their force everywhere so far as they do not cause prejudice to the powers or
rights of such government or of their subjects.") (emphasis added).
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transnational disputes into battlegrounds for the conflicting
overlapping laws of multiple stakeholders-the resolutions of
which would be consigned not to law, but instead to a notori-
ously capricious courtesy.
VI. COHERENCE ACROSS COURTS
When it comes to different judicial bodies tasked with ap-
plying the same law, a potentially instructive phenomenon is
the tendency of different U.S. circuits to try to harmonize in-
terpretations of U.S. federal law. An opening observation, ma-
terial to fears that fragmentation irredeemably hurts interna-
tional law's status as "law,"133 is that these courts are, of course,
not always successful. But just because different courts may ap-
ply the same law differently cannot in itself delegitimize that
law, since this happens to be an inevitable feature of any legal
system in which law is administered by more than one court.
Nobody would say, for example, that a federal law subject to a
circuit split does not count, and function, as law.
And yet there exists a strong norm of uniformity that per-
vades federal court decision-making and that favors fostering
the coherence of federal law throughout the United States.134
Some circuits have even transformed this norm into doctrine
in the form of a presumption of uniformity.135 The rationale is
familiar. To quote Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, "a single sovereign's laws should be applied equally
133. See, e.g., Charney, supra note 72, at 699.
134. I address counterarguments to my use of this analogy, and the desira-
bility of coherence generally, later in the article. See infra Part VII.
135. See Alt. Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir.
2004) ("A court of appeals should always be reluctant to create a circuit split
without a compelling reason."); Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Home-
stead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We decline to create a
circuit split unless there is a compelling reason to do so."); Wagner v.
Pennwest Farm Credit, ACA, 109 F.3d 909, 912 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[W]e would
require a compelling basis to hold otherwise before effecting a circuit
split."); Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1979) ("Each of
these circuit courts carefully analyzed the constitutional questions; in our
judgment their reasoning is impervious to further attack and needs no fur-
ther amplification. Although we are not bound by another circuit's decision,
we adhere to the policy that a sister circuit's reasoned decision deserves
great weight and precedential value. As an appellate court, we strive to main-
tain uniformity in the law among the circuits, wherever reasoned analysis will
allow. . . .").
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to all-a principle expressed by the phrase, 'Equal Justice
Under Law,' inscribed over the great doors to the United
States Supreme Court."13 6 Or as Evan Caminker put it, "na-
tional uniformity of federal law ensures that similarly situated
litigants are treated equally; this is considered a hallmark of
fairness in a regime committed to the rule of law."137 Further,
in a "system of multiple potential venues for dispute resolu-
tion, uniformity becomes a practical prerequisite to predict-
ability" as well.138 The rationale behind and judicial practice of
promoting uniformity have extended to interpretations of in-
ternational law too, and naturally so, since it too purports to
be the law of a single system.
In what follows, this Article builds through example a
couple of what might be considered coherence methods-in
contrast to conflict methods-to help guide decision-makers
addressing fragmentation. One is a "presumption of coher-
ence." Another is a "presumption of catholicity," that is a pre-
sumption toward using as much of the universe of interna-
tional legal sources and materials available as possible to re-
solve disputes. The first coherence method's function largely
speaks for itself, though it will be elaborated through case ex-
amples. The second coherence method functions mainly as a
bulwark against parochial or idiosyncratic interpretations of
international law unmoored from and unguided by the full
spectrum of international legal materials. In this respect, it
contributes to coherence through "integrity," to use Ronald
136. Sandra Day O'Connor, OurJudicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
1, 4 (1985); see also id. at 5 ("It is no wonder, then, that one of the Supreme
Court's most important functions-and perhaps the most important func-
tion-is to oversee the systemwide elaboration of federal law, with an eye
toward creating and preserving uniformity of interpretation.... I breach no
confidence in saying that the most commonly enunciated reason for grant-
ing review in a case is the need to resolve conflicts among other courts over
the interpretation of federal law."); see also, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816) (describing "the importance, and
even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United
States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution," and explain-
ing that in the absence of uniform interpretation of federal law, "the public
mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable;
and it cannot be believed that they could have escaped the enlightened con-
vention which formed the constitution").
137. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1, 39 (1994).
138. Id.
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Dworkin's term-using faithfully all relevant legal materials to
"provide the best constructive interpretation of the commu-
nity's legal practice."139 Or, as Jack Balkin writes, "to make
sense of a jumbled mass of [legal materials] and to infer from
these a coherent scheme of legal regulation that [the judge]
can apply to the case before her." 14 0 The two presumptions are
symbiotic in that they both press decision-makers to consider
the reasoning and results reached by other decision-makers on
the same or substantially similar legal issues. The Article then
addresse how these methods might work in international deci-
sion-making among regimes using the conflicts from the be-
ginning of this Article between the ICJ's and ICTY's different
tests for state responsibility and the conflict between human
rights law and humanitarian law on what standard governs the
arbitrary deprivation of life. Finally, I address critiques of the
Article's harmonization desideratum, including critiques from
the U.S. system that might extend to its analog in the interna-
tional system.1 41
A. Presumption of Coherence
A presumption of coherence urges decision-makers to de-
cide international legal issues in a manner consistent with
other bodies that have already addressed the issues and to use,
and build upon, those other analyses. It is only a presumption,
however, and thus a wrong or incomplete analysis ought not
lead a later decision-maker down the wrong analytical path or
139. RONALD DwoRIuN, LAw's EMPIRE 255 (1986).
140. J. M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and
the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 123, 132 (1993).
141. See Amanda Frost's insightful article questioning the values, and the
weights of the values, traditionally assigned to uniformity of federal law.
Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REv. 1567 (2008). Her argu-
ments address a number of facets of the uniformity issue in U.S. law, some of
which-like the Supreme Court's docket, separation of powers, and original
understanding-are not implicated by the present discussion. But she also
addresses more general normative arguments about federal uniformity that
may be potentially implicated by the present discussion, even if they are not
exactly transferrable to the international legal system. I would like to use
them, or what I see as their international law variants, below as starting
points to address some of the concerns or criticisms my approach may elicit.
See infra Part VI.C.
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to the wrong result. 142 To the contrary, the presumption
should force later decision-makers to reexamine both the rea-
soning and the result of the prior decision, even if it is from
another jurisdiction. This process of engagement and reen-
gagement with the rationes dicidendi of prior decisions com-
ports with systems theory's emphasis on recursive, self-referen-
tial dispute resolution according to a common internal
logic. 1 43 It effectively unifies legal analysis across jurisdictions
on a shared question of law so that the best or fittest rule
prevails. To borrow what seems like a reasonable standard
from the federal law context, later decision-makers should not
depart from previous decisions absent a "compelling" basis to
do So. 1 4 4 Ignoring other analyses is thus not methodologically
viable; indeed, as proposed below, because of international
law's unique nature, a presumption of coherence ought to in-
quire into both earlier decisions and the methodologies those
decisions employed. Also, because the law at issue is interna-
tional law, the universe of legal sources extends to encompass
decisions of both national and international decision-makers
with appropriate jurisdiction-a point that dovetails with the
presumption of catholicity discussed in the next section.1 4 5
A high profile (and highly contentious) example of this
sort of presumption is the Southern District of New York's
most recent decision in the epic South African Apartheid Litiga-
tion under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute (ATS).146 The procedu-
ral history is both labyrinthine and pertinent. In a 2009 order,
the S.D.N.Y. held that corporations can be liable for violating
international law norms under the ATS.1 4 7 The defendant cor-
porations. sought a writ of mandamus in the Second Circuit on
142. See, e.g., Mar. Ins. Co. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 983 F.2d 437 (2d
Cir. 1993) (atrophying prior Second Circuit decision that judicially
amended the treaty at issue); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123
(7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that "unless the earlier decision is authoritative,
the court that decides the later case does not discharge its judicial responsi-
bilities adequately by merely citing the earlier decision and following it with-
out so much as indicating agreement with it, let alone analyzing its merits").
143. See supra Part V.
144. See cases cited supra note 135.
145. See infra Part VI.B.
146. In re South African Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454 (S.D.N.Y.
2014).
147. In re South African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 255
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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the issue. But while that was pending, the Second Circuit de-
cided Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., which held that corpo-
rations could not be liable under the ATS. 148 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Kiobel, initially on the corporate lia-
bility question, 149 but then switched course after oral argu-
ment by requesting additional briefing and holding a second
round of argument on whether ATS claims arising abroad
could be brought in U.S. courts to begin with.1 50 The Court
decided Kiobel on the latter basis, holding that ATS claims are
subject to a presumption against extraterritoriality that the Ki-
obel claims failed to overcome.15 1 At the end of the opinion,
the Court indicated that to overcome the presumption, claims
must "touch and concern the territory of the United States,....
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extra-
territorial application." 52 But again, as to the specific claims
in Kiobel, the Court noted-in language that became pregnant
for lower courts-that "[c]orporations are often present in
many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere
corporate presence suffices." 5 3
Given this oblique nod to the possibility of corporate lia-
bility under the ATS, the question at issue in the most recent
district court opinion in the South African Apartheid Litigation
was whether, after the Supreme Court's Kiobel decision, the
Second Circuit's holding that corporations cannot be liable
under the ATS was still good law. 154
The resulting district court opinion could not have been
more deferential to an emerging trend of corporate liability
under international law in the United States. It began with two
quotations from other circuits-the D.C. Circuit and the Sev-
enth Circuit-both of which held that corporate liability exists
under the ATS.155 It surely did not hurt that all the other ap-
148. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
149. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472, 181 (2011).
150. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012).
151. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
152. Id. at 1669.
153. Id.
154. In re South Afican Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d at 457.
155. Id. at 455. Indeed, instead of just following the quotation with a cita-
tion to the other circuit court of appeals, the opinion names the other cir-
cuit judge who authored the opinion, almost making it personal for the Sec-
ond Circuit to disagree.
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pellate decisions agreed with the S.D.N.Y.'s initial assessment
of corporate liability; but I want to focus more on the method-
ology of marshaling formally non-binding rationales and deci-
sions to great effect. The S.D.N.Y. decision also did not grap-
ple with the lack of an extant international law of corporate
liability. And in this sense, it presents another interesting ques-
tion of how international law evolves recursively from non-
norm to norm.
Before the S.D.N.Y. could reach the corporate liability is-
sue, it had to find that the Supreme Court's Kiobel decision
had "called into question" the Second Circuit's prior hold-
ing.15 6 In an interesting twist, the Second Circuit Kiobel opin-
ion's author, Judge Jose Cabranes, weighed in on precisely this
issue in an intervening 2014 ATS opinion, Chowdhury v.
Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd.15 7 Although not necessary to
that decision's holding (which disposed of the ATS claims on
extraterritoriality grounds)15 8 Judge Cabranes nonetheless re-
marked that " [p] laintiff's claims under the ATS .. . encounter
a second obstacle [because] the Supreme Court's decision in
Kiobel did not disturb the precedent of this Circuit that corpo-
rate liability is not . .. currently actionable under the ATS."' 59
To counter this remark, the S.D.N.Y. in the South African
Apartheid Litigation latched onto a (correct) statement from a
concurring opinion in Chowdhury that Judge Cabranes' remark
was dicta,160 and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Doe I v. Nes-
tle,16 ' reaffirmed corporate liability under the ATS after the Su-
preme Court's Kiobel decision. Thus, even before reaching the
corporate liability issue, the S.D.N.Y. had already demon-
strated a willingness to reject the Second Circuit's reasoning
by relying on decisions from other circuits.
As to the question of corporate liability under interna-
tional law, the S.D.N.Y. labeled the Second Circuit's Kiobel
opinion "a stark outlier."1 62 More specifically, the district court
explained, " [i] t is the only opinion by a federal court of ap-
156. Id. at 460.
157. Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42 (2d
Cir. 2014).
158. Id. at 49-50.
159. Id. at 49 n.6.
160. In re South African Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d at 459.
161. Doe I v. Nestle, 766 F.3d 1013, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2014).
162. In re South African Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d at 461.
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peals, before and after [the Supreme Court's decision in] Ki-
obel II, to determine that there is no corporate liability under
the ATS."16 s
The district court then undertook an analysis that leaned
very heavily on the reasoning of other courts of appeal to de-
termine the existence of corporate liability. Employing the
longstanding private international law technique of d6perage,
the court separated out the international substantive prohibi-
tion on the one hand, from its manner of enforcement on the
other, and assigned each a different body of law. While the
substantive prohibition derived from international law, its
manner of enforcement derived from domestic law. 164 Here
the court quoted at length the D.C. Circuit's decision in Doe v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 165 and the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.,166 repeating their respec-
tive d6pefage analyses. The D.C. Circuit explained that, "' [b]y
way of example, in legal parlance one does not refer to the
tort of 'corporate battery' as a cause of action; the cause of
action is battery; agency law determines whether a principal
will pay damages for the battery committed by the principal's
agent.' "167 And the Seventh Circuit noted, "'[i]nternational
law imposes substantive obligations and the individual nations
decide how to enforce them,' including whether, for example,
to hold a corporation responsible for the conduct of its
agents. "168
Moreover, the district court borrowed other circuits' criti-
cisms of the Second Circuit's Kiobel decision, for instance
openly adopting the critique of 'Judge Richard Posner of the
Seventh Circuit" that "'the factual premise of the [Second Cir-
cuit] majority opinion in Kiobel'-that no corporation has ever
been held liable in a civil or criminal case for violations of cus-
tomary law norms-'is incorrect.' "16 9 And, that just because
163. Id.
164. Id. at 462 (explaining the "distinction between a principle of law ...
and the means of enforcing it." (quoting Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber
Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2011)).
165. Id. (quoting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011),
vacated on other grounds, 527 F. App'x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
166. Id. (quoting Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1013).
167. Id. (quoting Exxon, 654 F.3d at 41).
168. Id. (quoting Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1020).
169. Id. at 464 (quoting Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017).
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historically there has not been much enforcement of interna-
tional norms of corporate liability, that does not necessarily
wipe out the legal possibility of such liability.170
In short, the S.D.N.Y. took advantage of a debatable line
in the Supreme Court's Kiobel decision and then employed the
nonbinding weight of other decisions to overcome a decision,
and its reasoning, from the district court's own circuit court of
appeals. In so doing, it removed a glitch in the system ob-
structing coherence, at least within the United States.
Whether this was legally correct I will address momenta-
rily. But foremost for present purposes is that the methodol-
ogy is instructive of how courts can utilize other jurisdictions'
international legal analyses and decisions to cultivate coher-
ence. As to whether the corporate liability conclusion was cor-
rect as a matter of international law, that too is effectively a
methodological question. A classical international lawyer easily
might say the holding was not correct due to lack of state prac-
tice and apinio juris, as well as the fact that in other areas-like
financing terrorism-international lawmaking instruments ex-
plicitly provide for corporate liability171 (expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius).172 At the same time, if one adopts a more ex-
pansive view of how international law is enforced, it does not
seem illegal to apply international law to corporations.17 3 Thus
methodologically, if other states, their courts, and interna-
tional tribunals trend in the direction of corporate liability
and adopt the international law-deriving techniques of the
S.D.N.Y. and the majority of other U.S. courts, the world may
witness, not the birth of corporate liability under international
170. Id. at 465.
171. See G.A. Res. 54/109, annex, International Convention for the Sup-
pression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 5(1) (Dec. 9, 1999) ("Each State
Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall take the necessary
measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its
laws to be held liable when a person responsible for the management or
control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence set
forth in article 2. Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative.")
(emphasis added).
172. I alluded to this argument in my article, AnthonyJ. Colangelo, A Uni-
fied Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1102 (2011).
173. I alluded to this argument in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court
in the Kiobel case and in my short article, based on that brief, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel and Beyond, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1329,
1341-43 (2013).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
40 [Vol. 49:1
FRAGMENTATION AND HARMONIZATION
law, but its actualization. None of this analytical ambivalence is
new to international law-for it has always been famously
tricky to discern in new areas precisely because state practice
and opinio juris must start somewhere.174
Which leads to the international, multisource nature of
the presumption of coherence. Because international law pur-
ports to govern everywhere, decision- makers must justify the
coherence of their reasoning and decisions within not just
their own national or discrete regime jurisdictions, but also
within all jurisdictions that have addressed the international
legal issue in question. Thus notably, the core argument
against corporate liability under international law in U.S.
courts has been not that other courts and international tribu-
nals around the world have specifically rejected corporate liabil-
ity under international law (that data would have created inco-
herence), but simply that there was no, or not very much, deci-
sional law one way or the other.1 7 5 This void left open the
possibility of developing the law in a way that characterized
corporate liability as an issue of remedies delegated to states'
municipal law under established private international law prin-
ciples.1 76 Admittedly, the case law and its evolution occurred
in the specific microcosm of U.S. courts, but the methods can
be extrapolated to international institutions operating both
against and within the same background of customary interna-
tional law. In both scenarios, we have formally independent
decision-makers shaping a law that is both internal and exter-
nal to their competences. Internal in that they have jurisdic-
tion over the dispute and the governing law, which the court is
authorized to dispense; and external in that the pronounce-
ments and dispositions are not binding on other decision-mak-
ers outside their jurisdictions faced with the same or similar
issues under the same law.
When it comes to decision-makers drawing from legal
sources outside their domestic or institutional jurisdictions to
address and resolve international legal issues, there are a
plethora of examples. For instance, faced with questions of in-
174. Cf Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017 ("There is always a first time for litigation
to enforce a norm; there has to be.").
175. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.
2010).
176. See supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
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ternational law, U.S. courts routinely rely on treaties 77 and
other international instruments, 78 as well as the reasoning
177. See, e.g., Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem.
Co., 517 F.3d 104, 118-20 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that the 1907 Hague
Regulations, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and the Fourth Geneva Convention,
among other international sources the plaintiffs relied upon, "do not sup-
port a universally-accepted norm prohibiting the wartime use of Agent Or-
ange. . . . Inasmuch as Agent Orange was intended for defoliation and for
the destruction of crops only, its use did not violate the international norms
relied upon here, since those norms would not necessarily prohibit the de-
ployment of materials that are only secondarily, and not intentionally, harm-
ful to humans."); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 257-59 (2d
Cir. 2003) (concluding that the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child "do not support the existence of a
customary international law rule against intranational pollution"); United
States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 939, 945-47 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties to support that "[blasic principles of
treaty interpretation-both domestic and international-direct courts to
construe treaties based on their text before resorting to extraneous materi-
als" and the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages to
conclude that plaintiff s due process rights were not violated); see also M.C. v.
Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 2d 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (explaining that
"[t]reaties may constitute evidence of the law of nations").
178. See, e.g., Vietnam Ass'n for Victims ofAgent Orange, 517 F.3d at 122 (not-
ing that the Nuremberg Charter's article 6 proscription of the "wanton de-
struction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity" is "too indefinite" to violate the norm of proportionality); Flores,
414 F.3d at 250-51, 263-64 (citing article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice to define "the proper sources of international law,"
but ultimately determining that the plaintiffs' reliance on decisions from the
International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights
were insufficient to condemn intranational pollution as a violation of inter-
national law); Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2002) (hold-
ing that article 28(a) of the Rome Statute "reinforces [the court's] holding
that there was no plain error" in giving the jury an instruction regarding
command responsibility); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp.
2d 304, 316-17 (D. Mass. 2013) (relying on the Rome Statute on the Interna-
tional Criminal Court articles 7(2) (g) and 7(1) (h) to define persecution as a
crime against humanity and citing the Nuremberg Charter's article 6(c), the
Rome Statute's article 7(1) (h), and the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR for
the proposition that "many of the international treaties and instruments that
provide jurisdiction over crimes against humanity list particular protected
groups without specifying LGBTI people"); Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F.
Supp. 2d 1112, 1155-56 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (citing the Nuremberg Charter to
give historical background to how crimes against humanity became recog-
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and decisions of international tribunals 179 and other bodies
tasked with interpreting and applying international law. 180
nized under international law and the Rome Statute for "the most current
definition of crimes against humanity").
179. See, e.g., Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 739-42
(9th Cir. 2008) (citing various decisions from the ICTY and the ICTR to
explain that genocide is a specific intent crime and that "[n] o decision from
either tribunal supports [plaintiffs] contention that genocide requires mere
knowledge, or general intent"); Ford, 289 F.3d at 1290-92, n.8 (citing deci-
sions from the ICTY and ICTR to conclude that "the command responsibility
theory of liability is premised on the actual ability of a superior to control his
troops" before explaining the distinction between dejure and defacto author-
ity. These tribunal decisions led the court to hold that no plain error oc-
curred in giving the jury a command responsibility instruction); Lively, 960 F.
Supp. 2d at 318-19 (citing Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, No.
IT-98-34-T, Judgment, 1 636 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia
Mar. 31, 2003) and Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judg-
ment, 1 1071 (Dec. 3, 2003) for the proposition that "international courts
have interpreted the identity of the group requirement [of a crime against
humanity] to encompass persecution of a discrete identity"; therefore, plain-
tiff "stated a claim for persecution that amounts to a crime against humanity,
based on a systematic and widespread campaign of persecution against
LGBTI people in Uganda."); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI,
2007 WL 2349343, at *3-11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (granting summary
judgment in defendants' favor, finding that the alleged "violent repression
of civilian oil protestors during the 1990s" did not rise to the level of a crime
against humanity after analyzing and quoting in depth several cases from the
ICTY and ICTR to explain what constitutes a widespread or systematic attack
directed at a civilian population for the purposes of a crime against human-
ity); Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-56 (citing cases from the ICTY
and ICTR as "affirm [ing] the status of crimes against humanity under inter-
national law" and to clarify that a single act can constitute a crime against
humanity if done in the context of a widespread and systematic attack
against a civilian population).
180. See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021-23
(7th Cir. 2011) (where a rubber plantation imposes strict quotas that alleg-
edly induce employees to "enlist their children as helpers," the United Na-
tions Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Labour Or-
ganization Minimum Age Convention, and the International Labour Organ-
ization Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention provide no "crisp rule" to
determine whether a violation of customary international law has occurred);
Abagninin, 545 F.3d at 739 (citing and quoting the Genocide Convention for
its definition of genocide as a specific intent crime); Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d
at 316 (beginning its analysis with the Human Rights Committee of the
United Nations' definition of "discrimination" as the basis of its discussion of
persecution as a "harsher subset of discrimination" that sometimes rises to
the level of a crime against humanity); Ali, 718 F.3d at 936 (relying on the
plain language of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to
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The result is to keep U.S. interpretations largely in line with
prevailing views on the content of international law, preserv-
ing its overall coherence.
But there is a paradox, illustrated by the corporate liabil-
ity issue discussed above. International law is not static; rather,it evolves with the shifting practices of states accompanied by
opinio juis. Accordingly, if the effect of a presumption of co-
herence were to freeze international law, the presumption
would clumsily (and counterproductively) arrest a founda-
tional feature of how international law is made and developed.
Thus, coherence does not mean stasis. Rather, it means using
the same type of reasoning and methodology to substantiate a
legal conclusion backed by common, ascertainable principles.
A constructive example would be stretching international
law in new-but analytically consistent-ways. In Sexual Minori-
ties of Uganda v. Lively, 181 the District of Massachusetts did just
that. Including the persecution of gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans-
gender, and intersex people under the rubric of crimes
against humanity, the court pulled not only from U.S. law but
also from the "variety of sources ... used to determine the
content of international law: treaties, [and] judicial decisions
of the 'courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction.' 1 8 2 Chief
among them were the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and other international tribunals' deci-
sions and reasoning. 8
The Lively court reasoned that although "many of the in-
ternational treaties and instruments that provide jurisdiction
over crimes against humanity list particular protected groups
without specifying LGBTI people,"184 significantly, "virtually
all of these instruments provide savings clauses," which (quot-
ing the Rome Statute), specifically afford inclusion of "other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible
under international law." 185 To round out the definitional ex-
tension to persecution based on sexual orientation, the court
determine that "international law permits prosecuting acts of aiding and
abetting piracy committed while not on the high seas").
181. Lively, 690 F. Supp. 2d 304.
182. Id. at 316.
183. Id. at 316-20.
184. Id. at 318.
185. Id. (citing and quoting Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court art. 7(1) (h)).
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noted that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) instruct that the jurisdictional boundaries of
the international law against persecution be "interpreted
broadly."18 6 Here the court quoted the ICTY directive that
"[t] here are no definitive grounds in customary international
law on which persecution must be based and a variety of differ-
ent grounds have been listed in international instruments." 8
Along with the tribunals' interpretive admonition that "the
boundaries of persecution are almost always defined by those
carrying out the persecution against a particular group,"1 8 8
and quoting again the ICTY's rationale that the perpetrator
"defines the victim group while the targeted victims have no
influence on the definition of their status,"18 9 the court recog-
nized a new-but analytically sound-victim class.
This Section purposefully introduced cases that pushed
the international legal envelope to illustrate the presumption
of coherence in line with this Article's larger project of not
only evaluating how international law may be understood
within a systems view, but also suggesting tools for addressing
the flourishing phenomenon of fragmentation. Using shared
methodologies as international law grows in new and conflict-
ing ways helps keep the law analytically interconnected, even if
some rules fray and shoot off in different directions. And that
interconnectedness-a systemically common way of approach-
ing and reasoning through legal problems-seems crucial to
the long-term coherence of law. 9 0
Couched within the presumption's actual operation, deci-
sion-makers should therefore strive to determine whether a
"compelling"1'9 basis exists to depart from earlier decisions,
186. Id. 318 (citing and quoting Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, No.
IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 636 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia
Mar. 31, 2003) (instructing that the jurisdictional limit to prosecute persecu-
tion based on race, politics, and religion must be "interpreted broadly"));





190. Harlan Cohen has superbly explained the alternative; namely, how
methodological differences in international legal decision-making lead to
deeper fragmentation. See generally Cohen, supra note 11.
191. See cases cited supra note 135.
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not just doctrinally but also methodologically. The promised
effect is to promote both coherence and doctrinal correctness.
As to the latter, if multiple decision-makers repeatedly employ
the same methodology to the same or a similar legal dispute,
the hope and expectation is that over time the more "correct"
decision prevails for the system.1 92
B. Presumption of Catholicity
Cases illustrating the presumption of catholicity-the idea
that courts should consult the whole universe of available in-
ternational legal materials-are legion.19 3 As the previous sec-
tion noted, U.S. courts faced with questions of international
law routinely pull from myriad and varied international legal
instruments and tribunal decisions. 19 4 Rather than re-rehearse
those examples and recycle those citations, this Section pro-
vides an example of a courtfailingto heed the presumption.' 9 5
Because the presumption is supposed to be a bulwark
against idiosyncratic or incomplete interpretations of interna-
tional law, it too promises to preserve both coherence and cor-
rectness over the long term. If a court fails to heed it, the court
not only foregoes contributing to the increasingly pervasive
project of international law, it also dilutes that law. Interna-
tional law exists and determines outcomes of a great many
cases and controversies, some of them incredibly important. A
legal system that fails to genuinely engage international law
self-sabotages: it foregoes an opportunity to help shape the law
in important areas and risks jurisprudential obsolescence. Of
192. Cf Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened By Multiple In-
ternational Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101, 130 (1999) (observing
that courts "taking account of decisions by other tribunals" results in "cross-
fertilization [that] promotes uniformity in the law and, more importantly, a
collective consideration of the legal issues, thus leading to an improvement
in the quality of the law").
193. See supra notes 177-80.
194. See supra notes 177-80.
195. As a presumption, it can be overcome. Say, a previous case that is
more or less exactly on point comprehensively evaluates the relevant inter-
national legal materials and persuasively marshals them in its analysis and
disposition of the international legal issue. It would not be inappropriate to
forego the same extensive analysis and rely on the previous decision's rea-
soning and result. Of course, a later court should carefully assess the merit of
the earlier analysis and decision, but it need not replicate it.
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course the law itself also suffers because of a missed opportu-
nity to refine itself.
Mamani v. Berzain involved, among other claims, ATS
claims by survivors of people killed in Bolivia during the civil
unrest in 2003.196 More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that
high-ranking government officials were liable for extrajudicial
killings and crimes against humanity under international
law.' 97 The case came to the Eleventh Circuit on an interlocu-
tory appeal questioning whether the plaintiffs had adequately
pleaded their ATS claims under international law. 198 The Elev-
enth Circuit concluded that they had not, and remanded with
instructions to dismiss.1 99 Interestingly, the court appended
the complaint to its opinion, 200 presumably for all to see how
inadequate the pleadings were. Yet ironically, the one hun-
dred and thirty-two paragraph complaint is extraordinarily de-
tailed and, when juxtaposed against the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure's own model pleading forms,20 1 looks easily to al-
lege facts sufficient to make out viable claims. It is hard to see
slapping the label "legal conclusion"202 onto a detailed
description of an eight-year old girl being shot through the
chest by government sharpshooters and crumpling dead next
196. Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2011).
197. Id. at 1150-51.
198. Id. at 1151.
199. Id. at 1157.
200. Id.
201. See FED. R. Civ. P. FoRM 11 ("Complaint for Negligence. 1. (Statement
of Jurisdiction-See Form 7.) 2. On date, at place, the defendant negligently
drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff. 3. As a result, the plaintiff was
physically injured, lost wages or income, suffered physical and mental pain,
and incurred medical expenses of $ . Therefore, the plaintiff de-
mands judgment against the defendant for $ , plus costs."); FED.
R. Crv. P. FoRM 12 ("Complaint for Negligence When the Plaintiff Does Not
Know Who Is Responsible. 1. (Statement ofJurisdiction-See Form 7.) 2. On
date, at place, the defendant name or defendant name or both of them willfully
or recklessly or negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff. 3. As a
result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or income, suffered
physical and mental pain, and incurred medical expenses of $
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant for
$ , plus costs.").
202. See, e.g., Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1153 (characterizing the plaintiffs'
claims under the Supreme Court's standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009), as "legal conclusions rather than true factual allegations").
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to her nursing mother as anything other than result-ori-
ented.203
Also devastating to the plaintiffs' claims was "the indefi-
nite state of the pertinent international law." 204 According to
the Court, the international law against crimes against human-
ity "is not clearly defined"; indeed, to the extent crimes against
humanity are "recognized as violations of international law," 2 05
the court elucidated, "[t]he scope of what is, for example,
widespread enough to be a crime against humanity is hard to
know given the current state of the law."2 0 6 What is so remark-
able about the Court's international law analysis is that it fails
to cite a single source of international law. In this regard, the
Court's statement that the scope of crimes against humanity "is
hard to know given the current state of the law" makes a cer-
tain degree of sense if one does not actually look at the law.20 7
Crimes against humanity have existed in international law
since at least the Allied Powers prosecuted the Nazis for these
crimes at Nuremburg after World War 11.208 In fact, crimes
against humanity have since been included in the jurisdiction
of virtually every international criminal tribunal in existence,
including the ICTY,209 the ICTR,210 the Special Court for Si-
203. See Complaint 1 40, Mamani, 654 F.3d 1148. This is but one of many
plainly sufficiently pleaded allegations. I also find incredible, for instance,
the court's entirely made up alternative explanation for plaintiffs' allega-
tions that [a]fter about an hour of constant firing on the ground, a helicop-
ter arrived on the scene, firing as it flew overhead. The helicopter carried
Defendant Sanchez Berzain, who was directing military personnel in the he-
licopter to fire their weapons. The helicopter flew over the area, circling
twice and firing at civilians on the ground before landing in Uni." Id. 1 69.
The court's response: "That the Defense Minister may have been directing
military personnel not to fire at uninvolved civilians is consistent with the
pleadings about his helicopter directives." Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1153.
204. Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1150.
205. Id. at 1156.
206. Id.
207. Anthony J. Colangelo & Kristina A. Kiik, Spatial Legality, Due Process,
and Choice of Law in Human Rights Litigation Under U.S. State Law, 3 U.C. IR-
VINE L. REv. 63, 69 n.38 (2013).
208. At Nuremberg, crimes against humanity were defined in Article 6(c)
of the London Charter. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of
Major War Criminals of the European Axis art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 279.0.
209. Statute of the ICTY, supra note 43, art. 5.
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erra Leone,2 1 1 the Special Panels for East Timor, 212 the Ex-
traordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 213 and the
ICC.214 Moreover, crimes against humanity have made up
large portions, and sometimes even the bulk, of the charges
and convictions for these courts.2 15 Crimes against humanity
are, in short, unquestionably part of international law today
and there is a vast and meticulous jurisprudence enforcing the
international law against them and defining their contours.
And while naturally there are areas of definitional debate (as is
true of many definitions of crimes, domestic and interna-
tional), the content of crimes against humanity is quite settled
and clear. As Antonio Cassesse observed, "[u]nder customary
international law the category of crimes against humanity is
sweeping but sufficiently well-defined." 2 16 There is no doubt,
for instance, that murder falls within the definition of crimes
against humanity.2 1 7 To be sure, the mens rea is even somewhat
reduced: according to case law, "it is sufficient for the perpe-
trator 'to cause the victim serious injury with reckless disregard
for human life."' 218
210. S.C. Res. 955, annex, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda art. 3 (Nov. 6, 1994).
211. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 2, Jan. 16, 2002,
2178 U.N.T.S. 138.
212. U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor Reg. 2001/25, On
the Organization of Courts in East Timor, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/
25, sec. 9 (Sept. 14, 2001).
213. G.A. Res. 57/228 B, annex, Agreement Between the United Nations
and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under
Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea art. 9 (May 22, 2003).
214. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
215. Lelia Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 AM.
J. INT'L L. 334, 344, 347, 349 (2013) (providing an extensive empirical assess-
ment of crimes against humanity prosecutions by international tribunals).
216. ANTONIO CASSESSE, CASSESSE'S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 98 (3d
ed. 2013).
217. Id. at 94.
218. Id. (citing decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); see
also id. at 98-99 (explaining that "it is sufficient for [the accused] to be aware
of the risk that his action must bring about serious consequences for the vic-
tim, on account of the violence and arbitrariness of the system to which he
delivers the victim. Thus, recklessness (or dolus eventualis) may be suffi-
cient.").
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Rather than engage a rich and noble international law
and jurisprudence on crimes against humanity-a law and ju-
risprudence the United States itself played a central role in
forming-the court in Mamani simply decided in conclusory
fashion that the complaint was legally defective because the
Court had unstudied doubts about the applicable law's defini-
tional contours. As a result, the court not only failed to con-
tribute to the ongoing project of international law, it diluted
and muddied that law through an impoverished and analyti-
cally empty discussion. A presumption of catholicity would
have counteracted this intellectual indolence by pushing the
court to consult the generous universe of international legal
materials that substantiate crimes against humanity. More
broadly, it would have helped avert the threat to international
law's coherence posed by incomplete and idiosyncratic analy-
ses.
C. As Applied to International Decision-makers
Examples of these types of techniques in international in-
stitutional decision-making already exist, indicating that inter-
national legal decision-making already leans toward systemic
resolutions of conflicts spawned by fragmentation. Indeed, a
good example is the conflict between the ICJ and ICTY dis-
cussed at the beginning of the Article. Recall that the ICJ had
advanced an "effective control" test for determining state re-
sponsibility, which the ICTY rejected and sought to replace
with a much less demanding "overall control" test.219 Although
the two international courts are formally independent of each
other, understanding that they were both engaged in the same
basic international lawmaking and law-applying enterprise, the
ICTY thoroughly analyzed the ICJ opinion and holding. In so
doing, it effectively employed presumptions of coherence and
catholicity. It recognized the "authoritative" test set forth by
the ICJ, engaged both the result and the reasoning of the ICJ
analysis, pulled from an array of international law materials,
and arrived at the functional equivalent of a compelling basis
to reject the "effective control" test in favor of a more relaxed
standard.220
219. See supra Part II.
220. See supra Part II.
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Opening with the observation that "a high degree of con-
trol has been authoritatively suggested by the International
Court of Justice in Nicaragua,"221 the ICTY explained both the
ICJ's test and its application, and found it unpersuasive on two
grounds. First, the ICJ test was unconvincing "based on the
very logic of the entire system of international law on State
responsibility," 2 2 2 and second, the test was "at variance with in-
ternational judicial and State practice: such practice has envis-
aged State responsibility in circumstances where a lower de-
gree of control than that demanded by the Nicaragua test was
exercised."223
On the first ground, the ICTY delved into a broad concep-
tual articulation of why the ICJ's effective control test was in-
consistent with the developing system of international law.
Specifically, the ICTY noted the system's "logic ... to prevent
States from escaping international responsibility by having pri-
vate individuals carry out tasks that may not or should not be
performed by State officials, or by claiming that individuals ac-
tually participating in governmental authority are not classi-
fied as State organs under national legislation and therefore
do not engage State responsibility."2 2 4 To be sure, according
to the ICTY's in depth assessment, "the whole body of interna-
tional law on State responsibility is based on a realistic concept
of accountability, which . . . aims at ensuring that States en-
trusting some functions to individuals or groups of individuals
must answer for their actions, even when they act contrary to
their directives."22 5 To hold otherwise would mean that "States
might easily shelter behind, or use as a pretext, the internal
legal system or the lack of any specific instructions in order to
disclaim international responsibility." 226
The second, "determinative" ground was that the ICJ test
was mistaken because it was contradicted by "international ju-
dicial and State practice."227 Here the ICTY marshaled state
practice and decisions from, among other sources, the Mexico-
221. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 1 99 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
222. Id. ¶¶ 116, 117-123.
223. Id. 1 124.
224. Id. 1 118.
225. Id. 1 121.
226. Id. 1 123.
227. Id. 1 124.
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United States General Claims Commission,228 the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal,229 the European Court of Human
Rights, 23 0 and various national courts.231 In other words, by re-
jecting the IJC test, the ICTY sought to make the law more
coherent in light of the relevant universe of international legal
materials, including state practice and decisions from a variety
of other courts and tribunals.
Both the ICTY's recognition of the ICJ's "authoritative"
test and its capacious engagement with that test, its rationales,
and its practical results, illustrate not only how the method-
ological tools push horizontally situated international deci-
sion-makers toward coherence and catholicity, but also how
they can bolster the quality of international legal analysis.
Again, a presumption of coherence is only that. Where sound
legal reasoning backed by the universe of relevant legal materi-
als points in a different direction, decision-makers should fol-
low and advance not only legal coherence but also correctness.
That path may involve selecting one rule over another or it
may be a more synthetic blend of different approaches. The
broader point is that the system does not simultaneously bless
multiple rules purporting to govern the same issue. Or, more
concretely, the system's decision-makers and observers do not
bless multiple rules purporting to govern the same issue by
throwing their hands up in resignation to the intellectually se-
ductive incantation of "fragmentation."
Standing in methodological contrast to the ICTY's ap-
proach to the splintered law of state responsibility is the ICJ's
subsequent riposte, which commenced with an attempt to den-
igrate the ICTY's legitimacy,232 and then proceeded to a half-
228. See Stephens v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 265,
266-67 (1927) (Gen. Claims Comm'n).
229. See Yeager v. Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 92, 11 23, 37, 39, 45
(1987); see also William L. Pereira Assoc. v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
198, 226 (1984); Arthur Young & Co. v. Iran, 17 Iran- U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 245
(1987); Schott v. Iran, 24 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 203, 1 59 (1990).
230. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513
(1996).
231. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 1 129 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
232. The ICJ challenged the ICTYs jurisdiction over the question of state
responsibility since the latter's jurisdiction was limited to prosecuting certain
crimes against international law, see Statute of the ICJ, supra note 42, art. 1,
and not, as the ICJ complained, "issues of general international law which do
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hearted effort to distinguish the ICTY test.2 3 3 Both moves can
be viewed as examples that fail to heed the twin presumptions
and lead to unsatisfactory decision-making from the system's
perspective. 234
First, although the ICJ acknowledged the ICTY test, rather
than give it a degree of deference that might in turn have com-
pelled a full-throated defense of the ICJ's own test, the ICJ
tried to dismiss the ICTY test-or, more specifically, the au-
thority of the body that articulated it. This led to a flimsy de-
fense of the ICJ test, one that upon inspection looks entirely
tautological and devoid of analytical content. The ICJ first ob-
served that the ICTY "'overall control' test has the major draw-
back of broadening the scope of state responsibility well be-
yond the fundamental principle governing the law of interna-
tional responsibility: a State is responsible only for its own
conduct, that is to say the conduct of persons acting, on
whatever basis, on its behalf."235 Consequently, according to
the ICJ, the "'overall control' test is unsuitable, for it stretches
too far, almost to the breaking point, the connection which
must exist between the conduct of a State's organs and its in-
ternational responsibility."23 6
Why? The IJC does not defend this position with legal ar-
gument and support. The first part of its analysis-that "over-
all control" is a bad test because it broadens the scope of state
responsibility-is not itself a legal argument; indeed, it's not
not lie within the specific purview of its jurisdiction," Application of Conven-
tion on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 1 403 (Feb. 26). Of
course, because the ICTY had to determine whether state responsibility ex-
isted in Tadic in order to prosecute crimes within its jurisdiction, its jurisdic-
tion did necessarily subsume the question of state responsibility. See Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, at Part IV; id. ¶ 80 (explaining that "the inter-
national nature of the conflict [which depended upon a finding of state re-
sponsibility] is a prerequisite for the applicability of Article 2.").
233. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Judgement, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 1 403.
234. I am certainly not the first to identify the IJC's methodological fail-
ures. See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of
State Responsibility," 106 Am. J. INT'L L. 447 (2012) (describing circular inven-
tion and reinforcement of international law by the ICJ and the ILC).
235. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Judgement, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 1 406.
236. Id.
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really an argument at all as much as it is a statement. And it is a
question-begging statement at that, since the very question
before the ICJ was which test is correct: the ICJ test that limits
state responsibility or the ICTY test that adopts a broader view.
The second step of the ICJ's analysis-which simply concludes
that because an "overall control" test would mean broader lia-
bility for states, such a test "stretches too far, almost to the
breaking point,"237 a state's liability for actors under its con-
trol-is even less enlightening. Nowhere does the ICJ seek to
bolster its conclusions with outside materials and sources as
the ICTY did; in fact, nowhere does the ICJ even attempt to
engage the sources the ICTY collected in support of the "over-
all control" test. Instead, the ICJ effectively ignores everything
that the ICJ itself did not say, allowing it to find that "settled
jurisprudence" had set forth the "effective control" test, the
settled jurisprudence here being only the jurisprudence of the
ICJ.
Next, the ICJ suggested that the case before it was distin-
guishable from the circumstances in which the ICTY applied
the "overall control" test.2 38 Here again the analysis was feeble.
In fact, the entirety of the ICJ's analysis consists of a single
(very long) sentence, which reads in pertinent part:
[T]hat logic does not require the same test to be
adopted in resolving the two issues, which are very
different in nature: the degree and nature of a State's
involvement in an armed conflict on another State's
territory which is required for the conflict to be char-
acterized as international, can very well, and without
logical inconsistency, differ from the degree and na-
ture of involvement required to give rise to that
State's responsibility for a specific act committed in
the course of the conflict.239
This Article of course strongly favors the common law
process of analogizing and distinguishing cases, or the idea
that like cases should be treated alike and different cases
should be treated differently. But while the ICJ indicated that
the case the ICTY addressed (which involved determining
state responsibility in order to discern the existence of an in-
237. Id.
238. Id. 1 405.
239. Id.
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ternational armed conflict) and the case before the ICJ (which
involved a pure question of state responsibility) were distin-
guishable, it gave no reason-logical, legal, or otherwise-why
this should be so. By contrast, the ICTY went to great lengths
to explain why the existence of an international armed conflict
necessarily hinged upon a determination of state responsibil-
ity.2 4 0 Thus if the ICJ in fact felt that the two cases were distin-
guishable, it passed up an important opportunity to explain
why and contribute to the body of recursive reasoning upon
which the international legal system's coherence depends. In-
stead it interposed an analytically unhelpful bump in the road
toward long-term coherence that the system will have to
smooth out one way or another if it proceeds down that path.
Finally, apart from the ICTY, other international courts
also have embraced what look like approximations of the -pre-
sumptions outlined above. For example, the European Court
of Human Rights has repeatedly observed that when interpret-
ing the European Convention on Human Rights, "[t]he Con-
vention should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony
with other rules of international law of which it forms a
part."241 In that connection, the Court relied on the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, widely accepted as codify-
ing the international law governing treaty interpretation,242
which provides what has come to be called the "principle of
systemic integration"24 3 in Article 31(3) (c). The article in-
structs that treaties should be interpreted in light of "any rele-
vant rules of international law applicable in the relations be-
tween the parties."244 Hence some methodological seeds al-
240. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, at Part IV
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
241. McElhinney v. Ireland, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, ¶ 36; see also Al-
Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 1 55, (interpretation of
the Convention "must also take the relevant rules of international law into
account"); Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 1 57 ("The Con-
vention should be interpreted as far as possible in harmony with other prin-
ciples of international law of which it forms part.").
242. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/1/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2016)
(stating that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties "constitute [s]
customary international law on the law of treaties").
243. See ILC Report, supra note 1, 1 479.
244. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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ready exist from which a unitary international legal system may
continue to blossom in common law form. 24 5
VII. LIMITATIONS AND CRITICISMS
This Part tries to anticipate and respond to potential criti-
ques, whether in the form of proposed limitations to, or criti-
cisms of, the Article's approach. As to limitations, because of
the data used (cases), the previous Part's coherence methods
plainly address on the surface judicial-type decision-making, or
what might be referred to as a "fragmentation of interpreta-
tion"246 of international law by different interpretive bodies.
But fragmentation may run deeper. It may, for instance, result
from different lawmaking regimes propagating different rules
245. As to conflicts between different areas of law like that typified by the
Nuclear Weapons case mentioned earlier in the Article, see supra Part II, deci-
sion-makers may contribute to systemic coherence via common law methods
of analogizing and distinguishing; that is, treating like cases alike and differ-
ent cases differently. LUHMANN, supra note 84, at 218. In the Nuclear Weapons
case the ICJ found that both international human rights law and interna-
tional humanitarian law applied in times of war, even though the different
laws prescribed different standards governing the arbitrary deprivation of
life. See Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 1 25. The ICJ resolved the conflict between them
through a formal technique tentatively embraced by the ILC Report-lex
specialis-or the canon that the more specific law applies over the more gen-
eral. ILC Report, supra note 1, ¶ 119. As the ICJ explained, "[t]he test of what
is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the
applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities." Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 1 25. As noted earlier, see supra note 65, to the
extent these types of formal technique may resolve conflicts within a single
system, they are in principle consistent with the overall thesis of this Article.
Yet they still pit two equally powerful laws against each other and stimulate a
host of on-the-ground methodological problems for actual decision-mak-
ers--as the ILC Report itself acknowledges-such as: "How does a particular
agreement [treaty] relate to the general law around it? Does it implement or
support the latter, or does it perhaps deviate from it? Is the deviation tolera-
ble or not?" ILC Report, supra note 1, 1 119. Rather than wrestle with such
difficult top-down interpretive questions of how different laws may or may
not fit together in the abstract, an easier and more organic approach would
be to simply differentiate a theater of war from peacetime by distinguishing
it factually as a "not alike" case via common law reasoning. Such an ap-
proach is also more faithful to system theory's affection for the common
law's recursive, iterative process of dispute resolution. See LUHMANN, supra
note 84, at 228.
246. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 388.
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that nonetheless concurrently purport to regulate the same ac-
tivity.24 7 And these rules may themselves draw deeper still from
different conceptions of what types of source materials make
up the relevant international law.248 This Article's use of case
illustrations to begin devising tools to assist the coherence of
international law in no way intends to ignore these other
strains of fragmentation; and neither does it mean to mini-
mize the different complexities and challenges other forms of
fragmentation may present for different international law- and
decision-makers going forward.
But this Article's primary project is to introduce a new way
of thinking about fragmentation, not to comprehensively solve
it in one fell swoop. (Indeed, a driving theme of the Article is
that resolution of fragmentation will be a recursive, incremen-
tal process growing out of the system's cumulative adaptation
to an ever-expanding international law administered by a pro-
liferating number of bodies.) Yet while the answer to how in-
ternational law will resolve varying and complex levels of con-
flicts in favor of coherence is beyond the prescience of this
author, I believe the presumptions outlined in the previous
Part offer a fertile starting point-and one that is not necessa-
rily limited to judicial or quasi-judicial decision-makers. That
is, stimulating awareness and consideration of how and why
other international decision-makers resolve similar or related
issues is not only, or does not need only to be, the province of
judges but also may occupy principal regulatory and other
bodies, whether on a technical, doctrinal, or even jurispruden-
tial level. It may well require some rethinking about how cer-
tain regulatory bodies typically function. But that's the point.
As is the critical and compulsory duty of determining what is
alike and what is unalike; a process that again reifies and re-
fines "the unity of the legal system."2 "9
As to potential criticisms, probably the most obvious is
that the approach is simply wrong: it fails effectively to de-
scribe the present international legal system and duly offers up
247. See, e.g., the discussion of the Nuclear Weapons case immediately above
at note 245.
248. Cohen, supra note 52, at 384-88. Cohen calls these types of fragmen-
tation "Fragmentation of Regulation" and "Fragmentation of the Legal Com-
munity," respectively.
249. LUHMANN, supra note 84, at 218.
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unsuitable prescriptions for conceptualizing and handling
fragmentation going forward. This objection essentially re-
prises the admonition cited earlier in the Article to "abandon
every hope." 25 0 And, within the scope of the Article's argu-
ment, there is not much more to say in response. International
law either is a unitary system that pursues coherence over the
long run, or it is not. For the rule of law and justice reasons
already elaborated, this Article argues for the view that the in-
ternational legal system is, or at least strives to be, a unitary
system and should be treated as such by decision-makers
tasked with making, interpreting, and applying international
law.
Unitary systems seek coherence, and coherence both
strengthens the law and makes it more operationally effective.
The alternative-a fragmented international law increasingly
pulled apart by centrifugal special interest forces-is more
likely to trap its subjects in a cobweb of conflicting rules and
interpretations. The law not only fights itself on an abstract
and doctrinal level, it also fails to guide behavior as success-
fully as it otherwise might because its dictates point in many,perhaps contradictory, directions at once. A law that becomes
both elusive and paralyzing is not much of a law. 25 1 Which is
why the methods proposed in the previous Part promote co-
herence and not just coordination.2 52
Another species of critique might question the desirability
of coherence as opposed to coordination among multiple spe-
cialized regimes. In strong form, the argument could comprise
a cluster of sub-arguments about specialization and even legiti-
macy since there may be a more direct and transparent line
running from a given rule of international law to the relevant
legal community, be it comprised of states or other entities,
250. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 30, at 1017.
251. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the Rule
of Law?, 22 EUR.J. INT'L L. 315, 338 (2011) (the rule of law "secure[s] indi-
vidual freedom by providing a predictable environment in which individuals
can act freely, plan their affairs, and make their decisions").
252. At this point, one might object more fundamentally that if interna-
tional law fails, too bad for international law. It failed, or got "fragmented."
Why defend international law in the first place? The answer is that interna-
tional law "works" in large part because a great many questions of possible
inter-state conflict simply do not arise because they already have been "set-
tled" by international law.
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subject to that rule.2 5 3 Take a specialized treaty regime. Sup-
pose its specialty is the law of the sea, or international trade, or
nuclear nonproliferation-it doesn't matter. We would expect
that each of these regimes would come up with the more
thoughtful and relatively optimal rules of international law in
that area compared with other international lawmaking appa-
ratuses given the regime's expertise. Moreover, states party to
that treaty regime have formally agreed to it, largely extin-
guishing objections that they unfairly had no hand in the mak-
ing of the international law at issue or that that law is being
imposed on them by external forces masquerading as the in-
ternational legal community.
These are meritorious points, to be sure. But they tend to
ignore that regimes are not operating in a legal vacuum-that
there is, in fact, a vast network of international law that the
regime's rules interact with. A regime that myopically develops
rules with only its own special interests in mind risks encroach-
ing upon or trampling other rules of international law. I cer-
tainly wouldn't be the first to suggest that international re-
gimes almost pathologically exhibit jurisdictional creep and
harbor imperial ambitions. And, although such rule predation
may not always be purposeful, it nonetheless places actors sub-
ject to multiple sets of laws in difficult and maybe even impos-
sible positions when it comes to compliance with "the law,"
broadly conceived.2 54 I should also say that we are not talking
about all law in a diverse and pluralistic world, including do-
mestic laws that may well reach across borders. Rather, we are
talking about a particular-indeed, exceptional-law that gov-
erns issues that command international, not just parochial, at-
tention. The great bulk of law in the world remains in the
hands of individual states or communities. But when it comes
to those issues that so interest all states that they've become
matters of international lawmaking, coherence should win out.
An imperfect but instructive analogy is to state and federal law-
making in the U.S. system. We are quite content to leave large
swaths of law to the local preferences of states, but some areas
command federal attention to preserve the union. And while
the U.S. system's allocation of these areas is more top-down (a
Constitution formally enumerates them) than international
253. For the inspiration of these points, see supra note 141.
254. See generally Colangelo, Conflicts of Law, supra note 11.
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law's more bottom-up approach, the same principles resonate.
Once something has been elevated to the level of federal law,diverse stakeholders must reach a compromise so that the law
is uniform across the land to preserve the national system. Sim-
ilarly, once something has been elevated to the level of inter-
national law-and that law "claim [s] a global validity" for it-
self255-diverse stakeholders also should reach a compromise
so that the law is uniform across the globe to preserve the in-
ternational system.
Circling back to specialized regimes, international law is
faced with the same justice tradeoff discussed earlier in the
Article between equality and advancing community values and
preferences. The relevant community is the specialized re-
gime, and if its rule is advanced at the expense of another
competing rule of international law, like cases are not treated
alike. Alternatively, like cases could be treated alike but the
regime's preferred rule is sacrificed as collateral damage. The
only way out of this apparent quagmire of injustice is for the
law to strive toward coherence so that both community values
are advanced and like cases are treated alike, fostering more
predictability as well. It may involve compromises to conform
to the broader schema of international law, but those com-
promises serve a larger normative commitment: justice.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Fragmentation presents international lawyers, scholars,
and decision-makers with what looks like an existential
threat-theoretically, doctrinally, and practically. Do we aban-
don every hope of a unitary system and settle for managing
divergent rules through conflict of laws methodologies, or do
we fight for the international legal system's coherence?
This Article draws from systems theory and its fulcrum
concept of autopoiesis to defend the view that international
law is a unitary system and, rather than posing an existential
threat, fragmentation may paradoxically be a growing pain in
the system's long-term maturation. The Article then proposes
two methodological tools for decision-makers seeking to ad-
vance the project of a unitary international legal system: a pre-
sumption of coherence and a presumption of catholicity. In
255. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 30, at 1009.
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combination, these tools aim to promote both legal coherence
and correctness without the compromises injustice that invari-
ably attend true conflict of laws disputes and the methodolo-
gies that resolve them. The objectives these tools seek are not
just academic. To the contrary, they have major consequences
for the increasing number of real world actors brought into
the fold of international law's rules as the law itself grows at an
amazingly fast rate, catalyzed in large part by unprecedented
advances in technology and communication. In the end, the
more coherent the system is, the better it will be-both opera-
tionally and normatively-at resolving a mounting and com-
plex palette of novel international disputes.
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